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Article
Justice in a Brave New World?
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT
As science fiction has become reality, we should consider the implications of
our new technologies for our system of justice. In addition to DNA, we are now
regularly using cameras, geo-tracking, facial recognition software, brain scans,
computers, and much more to discern and record our physical and mental
surroundings. Existing technology and more we cannot yet imagine will
increasingly take the place of often unreliable evidence, such as that provided by
eyewitnesses. Yet, we have given far too little thought as to how these advances
should impact our civil and criminal dispute resolution systems.
Historically, many justice systems have emphasized the importance of finding
the truth. Our new forms of technology will arguably help us discover the truth, and
thereby potentially enhance justice. Upon reflection, however, it is not clear that
our scientific innovations will necessarily yield greater truth, much less justice. The
products of our technology will inevitably be subject to human interpretation and
argument, and justice has always been about far more than truth.
This Article argues that we should focus on three critically important issues as
we consider how to redesign our system of justice to accommodate our new
technology. First, recognizing that judges and jurors will often lack the competence
to interpret scientific data, we should rely more heavily on neutral scientific experts.
Second, in light of the psychology of multiple interpretations, we will want to ensure
that our technological evidence is interpreted by a diverse audience. Third, the
greatest contribution of our powerful new technology may be that it helps us
recognize that justice involves much more than finding the truth. Even assuming we
could agree on what happened in the past, alternative visions of justice influence
how a community will want to deal with past events, such as through punishment,
compensation, reparations, apology, or in other ways. By deemphasizing the
centrality of truth, we can focus more on other important aspects of justice,
including examining motivations, healing community rifts, enunciating community
norms, providing procedural justice, protecting human rights, and providing
cost-effective access to our dispute resolution system. Focusing on this broad array
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of concerns will encourage us to reform our litigation system in creative ways and
also to rely more heavily on non-litigation approaches to justice.
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Justice in a Brave New World?
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT *
INTRODUCTION
A man was recently charged with a 1993 murder based on DNA
obtained from a napkin he discarded at a hockey game.1 As science fiction
has become reality, we must consider the implications of new technology
for our system of justice. In addition to DNA, we are now regularly using
cameras, geo-tracking, facial recognition software, brain scans, and more to
discern and record our physical and mental surroundings.2 Our phone
records, financial transactions, and social media are preserved not only in
our devices but also in the “cloud.”3 We are even developing the capabilities
to read emotions4 and memories.5 This technology and more we cannot yet
imagine will increasingly take the place of often unreliable evidence, such
as eyewitness testimony.6 Yet, while these technological advances are
amazing, we have given far too little thought to how these scientific
developments should impact our approach to civil and criminal conflicts.
Historically, many justice systems have emphasized the importance of
finding the truth. Whether through trials by ordeal, oaths, or more modern
trials, we have endeavored to find out who did what to whom and why. Part
I summarizes this historical focus and then describes how new technology
*

Michael and Sonja Saltman Professor of Law and Founding Director, Saltman Center for Conflict
Resolution, University of Nevada – Las Vegas Boyd School of Law. I dedicate this Article to Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, whose work has greatly inspired my own. I received helpful feedback from
presentations at Marquette University Law School and the AALS Dispute Resolution Section Works-inProgress session and from Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Michael Moffitt, Lydia Nussbaum, Andrea
Schneider, Judy Sternlight, and Ron Wright. I am very grateful for the exceptional work done by UNLV
law librarians Youngwoo Ban and Jennifer Gross and by my research assistants: Arthur Burns, Robin
Gonzalez, Haley Jaramillo, Corey Juelke, Stacy Norris, and Shannon Zahm.
1
Sarah Mervosh, DNA From Napkin Used at Hockey Game Leads to Charge in a 1993 Murder,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2019, at A9 (describing law enforcement’s use of genealogical databases to identify
suspects). Similar technology was famously used to apprehend the alleged Golden State Killer, who was
charged with murdering, raping, and burglarizing victims over several decades. See infra text
accompanying note 72.
2
See infra Section I.B.
3
See infra text accompanying note 61.
4
See infra text accompanying note 58. See also infra Section I.B.2 (discussing a variety of
technologies used to directly and indirectly assess what people are thinking).
5
See infra text accompanying notes 110–26.
6
See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Science and the Legal System, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 1, 5 (2018) (explaining that the development of DNA testing shed light on the fallibility of
eyewitness testimony).
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will arguably help us discover the truth, thereby potentially enhancing
justice.7
Upon reflection, however, it is not clear that our scientific innovations
will necessarily yield greater truth, much less justice. Part II.A explains that
for technical, psychological, and philosophical reasons, new technology will
not necessarily help us find truth. From a technical standpoint, mistakes will
be made, and results can even be faked. Psychologically, even the most
brilliant of technologies will ultimately be designed and interpreted by
humans and thus be subject to human biases. Philosophically, perhaps any
search for ultimate truth is doomed because no single truth exists.
Part II.B argues that to the extent our new technology may help us find
truth, its greater contribution, ironically, may be that it helps us recognize
that justice involves much more than truth. Even assuming we could agree
on what happened in the past, alternative visions of justice influence how a
community will want to deal with that past, such as through punishment,
compensation, reparations, apology, or in other ways. Both currently and
historically, trials have never focused exclusively on truth. As well,
non-adjudicatory processes such as mediation, negotiation, or community
conferences have always emphasized aspects of justice other than truth.
Whereas trials are generally structured to yield a single answer, other forms
of dispute resolution are premised on recognition of complexity—that
multiple truths can exist and that alternative solutions are possible.
Finally, Part III considers how we ought to redesign our system of
dispute resolution8 to accommodate our new technology and achieve greater
justice. It suggests we look for processes to help us deal with three critically
important issues: the inevitable fallibility of the technology, the psychology
and philosophy of multiple interpretations, and the goals of dispute
resolution that reach beyond merely finding the truth. By encouraging us to
contemplate these and other issues, perhaps our technological innovations
can help spark a rethinking of our system of justice that is even more exciting
and innovative than the new technology itself.
I. A FIRST TAKE—OUR NEW TECHNOLOGY WILL ENABLE TRIALS TO
FULFILL THEIR PURPOSE OF UNCOVERING TRUTH
A. Trials’ Purpose of Uncovering Truth
In both the criminal and civil context,9 we often use trials to try to figure
7
While the privacy implications of our new technology are also both fascinating and disconcerting,
that is not the subject of this Article.
8
This Article uses the phrase “dispute resolution” to refer to both litigation and alternatives thereto,
such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.
9
While our society in the United States draws a sharp distinction between criminal and civil
disputes, many other societies do not.
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out who did what to whom or what and why, as well as to assess the impact
of such actions.10 In the seventeenth century, Chief Justice Coke claimed
that trials are “the finding out by due examination of the truth of the point in
issue.”11 Indeed, “[i]n its widest meaning the word ‘trial’ is synonymous
with ‘test,’” such as a scientific examination.12 More recently, Judge Marvin
Frankel simply stated: “Trials occur because there are questions of fact. In
principle, the paramount objective is the truth.”13 While trials are clearly
designed to do justice, as well as to seek truth, it is clear that truth-seeking
lies at the heart of many legal disputes.14
10
Admittedly, trials have become a rarity in both the civil and criminal context in the United States.
As to civil trials, see, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012); Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, The Continuing Decline of Civil Trials in
American Courts, POUND CIV. JUST. INST. 3–6 (2011), http://www.poundinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/2011-Forum-Galanter-Frozena-Paper-1.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). As to
criminal trials, recent federal statistics show just over two percent of cases going to jury trial. Federal
Judicial Caseload Statistics: Table D-4. U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type
of Disposition and Offense, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2017, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 31,
2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_d4_0331.2017.pdf. State statistics
are similar. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES 24 tbl.21 (2013),
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4845 (showing two percent of felony convictions
resulted from trials). Nonetheless, trials remain important because they are the backdrop for both
settlements, see, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968–69 (1979), and dispositive motions such as motions for
summary judgment. Prosecutors consider how evidence would play to a jury in deciding which cases to
bring, how to structure those cases, and whether to enter into plea negotiations. Anna Offit, Prosecuting
in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. L. REV. 1071, 1072–73 (2019).
11
1 JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS IN ENGLAND AND EUROPE, 1200–1700: THE TRIAL IN HISTORY 5
(Maureen Mulholland & Brian Pullan eds., 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also JEROME
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 80 (1950) (questioning trials’
ability to find truth); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability
of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1360 (1985) (“A trial is ostensibly structured as a truth-seeking
process concerned with justice for the parties.”).
12
Mullholland & Pullan, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing the use of “trials” to test faith, in the Old
Testament, and describing the use of trials in scientific contexts, to evaluate data). In medieval England
the “why” was at least as important as the “what.” Juries focused substantially on the hearts and minds
of the accused, and acquitted most accused. ELIZABETH PAPP KAMALI, FELONY AND THE GUILTY MIND
IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1–2 (2019).
13
Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1033
(1975) (contending that while truth is the theoretical goal, in practice our adversarial system does not
serve the goal as well as it might, and therefore suggesting potential reforms to our adversarial system).
Cf. Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1063 (1975)
(urging that while a trial is, in part, a search for truth, it also serves many other purposes including
protecting the dignity interests and constitutional rights of the parties).
14
Cf. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 541–42
(1978) (asserting that distributive and procedural justice are more central in most legal disputes than is
the determination of truth). While Thibaut and Walker assert that a small category of disputes involve
“strong elements of both truth and justice claims,” id. at 542, I believe that many if not most legal claims
involve disputes as to both truth and justice. See also Justin Sevier, A [Relational] Theory of Procedure,
104
MINN.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2020)
(manuscript
at
54),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405763 (drawing on empirical studies to critique
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Until recently, we typically relied on witness testimony, physical
evidence, or (longer ago) purported supernatural insights to try to find the
truth. In some societies, disputes have been resolved by community
members who might have personal knowledge of the events that transpired
or the character of the disputants.15 When personal knowledge was scant,
trials by ordeal, trials by battle,16 and oaths17 were sometimes used to try to
determine who was lying and who was telling the truth. One common ordeal
required accused criminals to plunge their arms into boiling water to retrieve
a ring, as a means of determining whether the accused had committed the
crime.18 If the arm of the accused was not harmed, he was found not guilty,
on the theory that God had protected the arm of an innocent man.19 Such
trials were used not only in medieval Europe but also in various other parts
of the world.20 Although trials by ordeal today sound both sadistic and
absurd, one economist has argued they may have been a fairly effective

Thibaut and Walker’s truth-justice dichotomy as incomplete and asserting instead that the public’s
perception of legal disputes depends upon both the nature and stage of the dispute).
15
E.g., JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN
SPECIAL JURIES 3 (2006).
16
See, e.g., Morton W. Bloomfield, Beowulf, Byrhtnoth, and the Judgment of God: Trial by Combat
in Anglo-Saxon England, 44 SPECULUM 545, 551 (1969) (“Trial by combat and ordeals in general were
methods used to get at the truth when oaths or compurgation would not elicit an unambiguous answer.”).
With trial by battle, “God was expected to support the truthful combatant.” VICKIE L. ZIEGLER, TRIAL
BY FIRE AND BATTLE IN MEDIEVAL GERMAN LITERATURE 8 (2004).
17
The medieval oath essentially took the place of witness testimony in that a sworn oath on relevant
matters had to be accepted and would end the legal dispute. See Rebecca V. Colman, Reason and
Unreason in Early Medieval Law, 4 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 571, 576 (1974) (“The majority of civil and
criminal cases were settled by oath-swearing . . . .”). However, while oaths were commonly used to
resolve cases, Colman reports that the preferred means to resolve disputes was “certain proof,” with oathswearers or ordeal to be used only when certain proof was not available. Id. at 578–79.
18
See Trisha Olson, Of Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial, 50
SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 115–17 (2000) (discussing the use of ordeals as a method of proof in medieval
Europe and use of the “ordeal of the cauldron”). Although medieval Europeans employed trials by ordeal,
these were not the primary means by which they resolved disputes. Rather, European societies used nonordeal trials as well as various forms of mediation and negotiation throughout the period when they also
relied on ordeals. See, e.g., THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE 236–37
(Wendy Davies & Paul Fouracre eds., 1986).
19
See, e.g., ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL BY FIRE AND WATER: THE MEDIEVAL JUDICIAL ORDEAL 1
(1986). This belief, that God would protect the innocent, was called iudicium Dei (judgment of God).
Peter T. Leeson, Ordeals, 55 J.L. & ECON. 691, 692 (2012). Additional ordeal practices included having
the accused grasp or walk on a red-hot piece of iron to see if they would remain unscathed or throwing
the accused into water to see if they would demonstrate their innocence by sinking. BARTLETT, supra, at
2.
20
See, e.g., BARTLETT, supra note 19, at 2 (“Ordeals of fire and water have been employed by
peoples in many different parts of the world and throughout history. They crop up in the laws of
Hammurabi and in the judicial practice of modern Kenya; men have undergone the ordeal from Iceland
to Polynesia, from Japan to Africa.”); H. GOITEIN, PRIMITIVE ORDEAL AND MODERN LAW 54–55, 58–
60 (1923) (discussing uses of ordeals by a broad range of societies including Hindu, Siamese, Iranian,
African, European, and others).
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means of uncovering the truth. In a world where everyone believes in
God’s power to determine truth and make that truth known, only the
innocent would typically willingly subject themselves to ordeals.22
As our ancestors’ faith in the supernatural lapsed,23 they instituted more
rationally-based inquisitorial and adversarial trials in front of either judges
or juries. In the inquisitorial system, used in most parts of Europe24 and
commonly throughout the world,25 the judge generally conducts hearings,
determines the law, examines witnesses and experts, and orders the
production of relevant documents.26 The role of the judge is highlighted in
the inquisitorial system because it is thought that judges, more than
disputants or attorneys, will place the appropriate emphasis on finding the
truth.27
Similarly, those who favor the adversarial approach to trials urge that
litigation brought between adverse parties is analogous to gladiators’
competition and is even more successful than inquisition in uncovering the
truth.28
21

Leeson, supra note 19, at 711.
Id. at 697–98 (employing rational choice theory to investigate the relationship between
superstition and law and suggesting that the priests who set up the trials may have knowingly or
unknowingly manipulated them to ensure that at least most of the defendants would be found to have
passed the trial).
23
Pope Innocent III and the Fourth Lateran Council of the Church banned the use of trials by ordeal
in 1215 on the ground that they were inconsistent with scripture. Finbarr McAuley, Canon Law and the
End of the Ordeal, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 473, 499, 508–11 (2006).
24
Trials by jury became common in England and trials by inquisition in the rest of Europe. 2
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I 138–44 (2d ed. 1923).
25
While U.S. commentators typically look to Germany or France to gain an understanding of the
inquisitorial approach, some have noted that we have significant inquisitorial elements in our own
system. The equity system used in the early years of this country was primarily inquisitorial, and the
more recent reliance on managerial judges and magistrates can also be seen as a rejuvenation of the
inquisitorial tradition. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1225 (2005)
(describing the “transformation” of the adversary system).
26
Id. at 1188; John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 827 (1985) (“Digging for facts is primarily the work of the judge.”). Although the parties and their
attorneys may make suggestions, it is typically thought unethical for lawyers to “prepare” witnesses for
their testimony. Mirjan Damaška, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1083, 1088–89 (1975); W. Zeidler, Evaluation of the Adversary System: As Comparison, Some
Remarks on the Investigatory System of Procedure, 55 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 390, 394 (1981).
27
See Langbein, supra note 26, at 847 (urging that factfinding is the central task of civil litigation
and that an inquisitorial system is more likely than an adversarial system to be effective in determining
truth); see also Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and
Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 212
(2014) (summarizing conflicting literature on the relative strength of the adversarial and inquisitorial
justice systems in finding truth, but concluding that Americans tend to believe inquisitorial systems are
better at finding truth and adversarial systems are better at providing justice).
28
See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 383–84
(1978) (explaining how an advocate “plays his role” in the adversary system); Gerald Walpin, America’s
22

222

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

In the adversarial model the parties are responsible for
initiating and conducting the litigation. They gather all the
evidence and present it orally, in open court, subjecting
witnesses to examination and cross-examination, and the court
serves as a neutral umpire, deciding the questions of fact and
law raised by the parties.29
Indeed, the Supreme Court has asserted that cross examination is “the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”30 The jury
often plays an important role in the adversarial system. Initially, English
juries were composed of community members who “came from the
neighborhood, and some of them, at least, were expected to know or to find
out the facts of the dispute in litigation, rather than to reach a verdict based
exclusively on evidence introduced in court.”31 Later, juries evolved to base
their deliberations only on evidence produced in court, but still focused on
ferreting out the truth.32
In short, while the forms of trials have changed over the years, we have
frequently emphasized the goal of trials to uncover the truth of what
occurred in the past.33 This quest for truth is also reflected in our due process
jurisprudence, which highlights the need to provide procedures that will lead
to truthful and accurate findings.34
B. New Technology Can Aid in the Search for Truth
On first impression it seems obvious that our new world of technology
will make it far easier to figure out who did what to whom, and why. Where

Adversarial and Jury Systems: More Likely to Do Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 176–78
(2003) (discussing the “attributes” of the roles in an adversary system, including the need to “neutralize
or destroy” evidence unfavorable to a client’s case).
29
Kessler, supra note 25, at 1188 (citations omitted). See also Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System,
in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 34 (Harold Berman ed., 1971) (calling the adversary system “a
philosophy that insists on keeping distinct the function of the advocate . . . from that of the judge, or of
the judge from that of jury”); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND
DEFENSE 49 (1984) (explaining that the parties initiate the proceedings and lawyers gather information,
but the judge is the most important player in the adversarial model); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 14 AM . LAW. 445, 447 (1906) (calling the
adversary system a “sporting theory” of justice).
30
See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1979) (quoting 5 WIGMORE § 1367).
31
OLDHAM, supra note 15, at 3. Such juries were said to be “self-informing.”
32
Id. (estimating that this “modern” jury emerged in the 1500s).
33
See generally John D. Jackson, Theories of Truth Finding in Criminal Procedure: An
Evolutionary Approach, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 475 (1988) (summarizing ongoing debate over whether
inquisitorial or instead adversarial processes are better at uncovering the truth).
34
See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a
person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.”).
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we once depended upon such limited evidence as eyewitness testimony,35
confessions,36 and documents, over time we also began to look at skid marks,
dents, bullet casings, footprints, and similar physical evidence.37 Next, the
development of purportedly more reliable evidence, including fingerprint
analysis,38 lie detectors,39 and particularly DNA analysis,40 has offered many
more tools to determine who did what, where, when, and to some degree
why. While many of these tools are far less powerful than many may
assume,41 juries these days tend to crave the supposed certainty of such
evidence—what some have called the “CSI effect.”42
Technology emerging today is more ubiquitous and more powerful, thus
potentially helping us to better answer these “what happened” questions in
both the civil and criminal context.43 Given the rapid arc of technological
development,44 it is clear that we will soon have even more investigatory

35

Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal
Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765, 765 (1995) (“[M]istaken eyewitness identification
is the single largest source of wrongful convictions.”).
36
See generally Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 49 (2010) (reviewing literature on police-induced confessions
and risk factors for error).
37
It turned out much of this evidence was not as good as we thought, though DNA identifications
can be quite helpful. For a damning critique of some of the technology upon which we have relied, see
Michael Saks & David Faigman, Failed Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its Way and How It Might
Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 154–56 (2008). See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF
THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT] (discussing the findings of a
congressionally authorized forensic study); D. Michael Risinger, Whose Fault?—Daubert, the NAS
Report and the Notion of Error in Forensic Science, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 519, 519 n.3 (2010)
(discussing the NAS Report).
38
See infra text accompanying note 61–66.
39
See infra text accompanying note 99–103.
40
DNA analysis has been widely used to exonerate the innocent. BRANDON L. GARRETT,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 216 (2011); see also When
They See Us, NETFLIX (2019), https://www.netflix.com/title/80200549 (Netflix series discussing
eventual use of DNA as well as confession to exonerate five young men infamously accused and
convicted of raping a Central Park jogger).
41
See infra Section I.B.1.
42
See, e.g., Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and
Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1336–37 (2009) (discussing the “CSI effect”);
N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction about Forensic Science Affects the
Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47 JURIMETRICS 357, 357–58 (2007) (discussing the
CSI effect and a study that found that CSI viewers were more critical of forensic evidence at trial).
However, while the media is well convinced that the CSI effect is real, not all legal scholars and
investigators are sure that it is. Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra, at 1340–42.
43
See infra Section I.B.1.
44
See, e.g., W. BRIAN ARTHUR, THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT EVOLVES
191–200 (2009) (discussing how the economy evolves with technology); RAY KURZWEIL, THE
SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY 51–56 (2006) (explaining the life cycle
of technology).
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tools. The next sections discuss both technologies geared to track past events
and also those designed to access the human brain.
1. The Technology of What Happened
Our new technology provides us with three ways to learn who did what,
when, and where. First, devices record our actions and communications.
Second, we can identify physical traces that we leave as we move through
the world. Third, technology allows us to be followed in real time as we
move through the physical world and as we take actions using that
technology.
i.

Recording Devices

Computers, phones, cameras, audio recording devices, and other kinds
of recording tools play a greater and greater role in figuring out who did
what, when, and to whom.45 In this country and others,46 many public and
private entities are placing cameras on streets, within public buses, and
inside and outside buildings, so that if “something” happens, a record will
exist.47 A few years ago cameras on a public bus, outside a gym, at a
tollbooth, and at an ATM, were used to track down the alleged killers of a
law professor who was mysteriously murdered in his driveway in
Tallahassee, Florida.48 Another better-known example was law
enforcement’s use of commercial and bystander photos to catch the Boston
Marathon bombers in 2013.49 Today, when crimes happen, it is becoming
45
See RANDOLPH LEWIS, UNDER SURVEILLANCE: BEING WATCHED IN MODERN AMERICAN 2
(2017) (discussing the “many different faces” of Big Brother); Robert Draper, They Are Watching You—
and
Everything
Else
on
the
Planet,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC
(Feb.
2018),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/02/surveillance-watching-you/ (describing the use
of CCTV monitoring in London to capture two gang members).
46
London has an extensive CCTV system of cameras “used to tackle crime and anti-social
behaviour.” CCTV, CITY LONDON POLICE, https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-andsupport/Pages/Public-Space-Surveillance-Camera-System-.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (stating that
the City of London Police control room monitors 100 public space surveillance cameras across the City
of London, with the capability of moving 360 degrees and positioned so that they do not intrude into
private areas).
47
See, e.g., Rick Rojas, In Newark, Police Cameras, and the Internet, Watch You, N.Y. TIMES (June
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/nyregion/newark-surveillance-cameras-police.html (“In
Chicago, the police have established surveillance centers where officers can watch incoming feeds from
some 30,000 closed-circuit cameras.”); 7 Chilling Crimes That Were Solved Thanks to Surveillance
Cameras, HUFFPOST (Feb. 10, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/10/chillingcrimes-caught-on-camera_n_6357324.
48
Sean Rossman, Prius Trailed Dan Markel on Final Morning, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (June
2, 2016, 10:47 AM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2016/06/02/dan-markels-finalmorning/85290112.
49
See Patrick J. Kiger, How They Identified the Bombers, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/inside-the-hunt-for-the-boston-bombers/articles/how-theyidentified-the-bombers/ [http://perma.cc/ED45-9DTA] (explaining how video footage from various
sources allowed law enforcement to identify and apprehend the bombing suspects).
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common for police to ask businesses and individuals to check and preserve
their video recordings in order to help find the perpetrators.50 In addition to
fixed cameras, we know that many individuals record events with their
phones.51 Police officers and police vehicles are increasingly equipped with
cameras and audio.52 Robots, toys, and other machines that are increasingly
part of our lives also may contain cameras and audio.53 Law enforcement,
family, nosy neighbors, or others may also be able to film what we are doing
using miniature insect-sized drones.54 As cameras become even smaller and
easier to use, we can expect that they will become ubiquitous, as illustrated
in the 2017 movie, The Circle.55
In addition to cameras, other devices are increasingly being used to
record human activity. For example, law enforcement is employing facial
recognition and iris or retinal scans56 to identify persons based on their
50

Faith Karimi, Home Surveillance Cameras Are the New Neighborhood Watch, CNN (Aug. 31,
2018,
2:11
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/30/us/home-surveillance-cameras-neighborhoodwatch/index.html (“In Illinois, the O’Fallon Police Department asked residents to help fight crime by
investing in neighborhood surveillance cameras and registering them with authorities. ‘Video
surveillance is one of the best methods for apprehending criminals and convicting suspects who are
caught in the act of committing a crime,’ the O’Fallon Police Department said in a statement.”).
51
See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, Man Who Filmed S.C. Police Shooting: Maybe God ‘Put Me There for
Some Reason’, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2015/04/09/meet-the-man-whose-video-led-to-murder-charge-against-south-carolinacop/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.52d2ea729264 (reporting on Feidin Santana’s decision to record a
white police officer firing his pistol at a fleeing, unarmed black man); see also Rose Eveleth, How Many
Photographs of You Are Out There in the World?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/how-many-photographs-of-you-are-out-therein-the-world/413389/ (noting that snapchat users share 8796 photos every second and, in 2013, Facebook
users uploaded more than 350 million images each day).
52
See MARY D. FAN, CAMERA POWER: PROOF, POLICING, PRIVACY, AND AUDIOVISUAL BIG DATA
8 (2019) (examining phenomenon of “toutveillance”—a society in which “people and the police are
recording each other from all directions, making everyone at once surveilled and surveillor”); Mary D.
Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 A LA. L. REV. 395, 399 (2016)
(“Law enforcement agencies are rapidly getting on the body camera bandwagon because officers are
realizing that recording encounters can help rebuild public trust, improve public as well as officer
behavior, and protect against false complaints.”).
53
Margot E. Kaminski et al., Averting Robot Eyes, 76 MD. L. REV. 983, 985–98 (2017); Kimiko de
Freytas-Tamura, The Bright-Eyed Talking Doll that Just Might Be a Spy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/technology/cayla-talking-doll-hackers.html (reporting on new
doll that records and reports the voices of children to its parent corporation).
54
See Dario Floreano & Robert J. Wood, Science, Technology and the Future of Small Autonomous
Drones, 521 NATURE 460, 460 (2015) (explaining that improved technological capabilities have allowed
for the increasing use of miniature drones for civilian applications).
55
THE CIRCLE (STX Films and EuropaCorp 2017).
56
See, e.g., Jessica Gabel Cino, Opinion, How Does Facial Recognition Technology Work?,
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 30, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/facial-recognition-facialrecognition-technology-technology-privacy-privacy-592117 (reporting on executive order that expands
facial recognition systems in major U.S. airports to monitor people leaving the United States, in hopes
of catching people who have overstayed their visas or are wanted in criminal investigations); Colin
Lecher & Russell Brandom, The FBI has Collected 430,000 Iris Scans in a So-Called ‘Pilot Program’,
VERGE (July 12, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/7/12/12148044/fbi-iris-pilot-
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images. One recent study showed that nearly fifty percent of all
Americans’ images are now contained in a facial recognition database being
built from driver’s licenses and other images.58 Artificial intelligence is also
being developed to allow us to identify emotions, as well as faces.59 When
we use our phones and other computers to communicate or create
documents, we leave evidence on the devices themselves60 and often also in
the “cloud.”61
ii.

Identifying Our Physical Traces

The two best known and most used means for tracking our physical
traces are fingerprints and DNA. For many years, fingerprints were thought

program-ngi-biometric-database-aclu-privacy-act (stating that one police department has collected iris
data from at least 200,000 arrestees between 2013 and 2016).
57
See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facialrecognition.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share (discussing new app, marketed to law enforcement, that has
scraped over three billion images from millions of websites and social media). The FBI’s Next
Generation Identification program uses a broad array of tools including palm prints, irises, and facial
recognition to provide what the Agency called “the world’s largest and most efficient repository of
biometric and criminal history information.” Next Generation Identification (NGI), FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics/ngi (last visited
June 12, 2018). In Great Britain, the police have equipped some of their vans with facial recognition
software so that they can drive around town and search for purported criminals. Dell Cameron, British
Cops Make First Arrest Using Facial Recognition Surveillance Vans, GIZMODO (June 6, 2017, 12:30
PM), http://gizmodo.com/british-cops-make-first-arrest-using-facial-recognition-1795852963. In China,
police officers are equipped with facial recognition glasses, and cameras powered by artificial
intelligence are placed all around the country in an effort to fight crime and catch suspects. Paul Mozur,
Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china-surveillance-technology.html.
58
Clare Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America,
GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org.
59
Tim Lewis, AI Can Read Your Emotions. Should It?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2019, 11:00 EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/aug/17/emotion-ai-artificial-intelligence-moodrealeyes- amazon-facebook-emotient; see also 60 Minutes, What’s on the Horizon for A.I.? (CBS
television
broadcast
commercial
June
23,
2017),
https://www.cbs.com/shows/60_minutes/video/vgqb09XuRGuCVynSsk3ZYCRV8WA257PX/ what-son-the-horizon-for-a-i-/.
60
See, e.g., In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During Execution of a Search Warrant on a
Black Lexus IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (ordering Apple to assist law enforcement in accessing the information on an iPhone
seized when executing a search warrant on the San Bernardino shooter’s vehicle); Clark D.
Cunningham, Apple and the American Revolution: Remembering Why We Have the Fourth Amendment,
126 YALE L.J.F. 216, 216 (2016) (discussing the Department of Justice’s attempts to access alleged
evidence on phones).
61
Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors
in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 362–64 (2010) (describing “the cloud” and
its
capabilities);
iCloud:
What
is
iCloud,
APPLE
(June
20,
2019), https://support.apple.com/kb/PH2608?locale=en_US.
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to provide a unique identifier, and law enforcement began to use them in
the early 1900s.63 As various law enforcement agencies have acquired banks
of fingerprints, and as courts have accepted fingerprints as evidence,64 the
technique has become more and more valuable.65 Our evolving fingerprint
technology even allowed investigators to identify the remains of a body that
had been buried in a potter’s field forty-five years earlier.66 While the tool is
certainly not infallible,67 it has undoubtedly provided us with a great deal of
information.
Tracing DNA is far more powerful than identifying fingerprints. After
scientists famously discovered its unique molecular structure,68 U.S. law
enforcement began to use DNA secreted in blood, hair, semen, or other
substances to potentially identify persons who had perpetrated criminal or
other acts.69 One famous early use of DNA evidence was the O.J. Simpson
murder trial in 1995, in which prosecutors sought to use blood stains to
implicate O.J. as the killer of his ex-wife.70 Today, law enforcement
authorities are both augmenting their own DNA databases and also
62

See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV.
13, 13–31 (2001) (providing history of our reliance on fingerprint analysis and noting that author Mark
Twain helped popularize the use of fingerprints as a law enforcement tool in his book Pudd’nhead Wilson
(1893)); see also Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters
with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1100–06 (1998) (explaining why courts
came to accept fingerprint identification so easily despite a lack of scientific validation); see generally
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTS: CLASSIFICATION AND USES (1985)
(discussing the uses and classifications of fingerprints).
63
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, supra note 62, at 20.
64
See generally Jennifer Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions
of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 127–41 (2008) (contrasting courts’ almost
universal acceptance of the validity of fingerprint analysis with experts’ wide-ranging skepticism as to
the scientific validity of the tool).
65
See, e.g., Jennifer Lynch, FBI Combines Civil and Criminal Fingerprints into One Fully
Searchable
Database,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Sept.
18,
2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/09/little-fanfare-fbi-ramps-biometrics-programs-yet-again-part-1
(describing the FBI’s new policy of combining civil and criminal fingerprints into one fully searchable
database).
66
Michael Wilson, Solved: The 47-Year Mystery of a Murder Victim’s Many Identities, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/nyregion/unsolved-harlem-murder.html.
67
See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 990–91 (2005) (discussing fallibility and error rates
in fingerprinting); Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification, supra note 64, at 141
(arguing that fingerprint science has not been sufficiently validated to be admissible in court); see also
infra text accompanying notes 178–81 (discussing how human mental frailties can lead to problems with
fingerprint evidence).
68
James D. Watson & Francis H. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure for
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737, 737–38 (1953).
69
JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING 48 (2010); SHEILA JASANOFF,
SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 55 (1995).
70
See William C. Thompson, DNA Evidence in the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 827,
827 (1996) (arguing that a jury could reasonably have concluded that the DNA evidence in the Simpson
case deserved little or no weight).
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increasingly looking to privately maintained databases. Further, DNA
tools are being refined so that scientists can potentially identify persons
using DNA identifiers provided by their relatives, as well as by themselves.
As a result, in several widely-publicized cases, police have used ancestry
databases to track down purported criminals, including the alleged Golden
State Killer.72 Additionally, police are now implementing a “DNA Magic
Box” that will allow them to use the technology more quickly and cheaply.73
While, as with fingerprints, the DNA identification tool is not infallible,74
clearly it has led to major changes in our justice system. DNA is regularly
being used in criminal trials,75 heavily featured on crime drama shows such
as CSI,76 may be used in civil contexts,77 and is even being employed to
identify whose dog littered its poop in a common area.78 DNA has also
sometimes helped liberate those who have been wrongly convicted.79
71

See ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA 15–16 (2015) for a
discussion of the national DNA database first established in 1998. See also Erin Murphy, DNA in the
Criminal Justice System: A Congressional Research Service Report* (*From the Future), 64 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 340, 343 (2016) (observing that, as of 2016, the CODIS database contained roughly
fifteen million known person files and seven hundred thousand forensic profiles, drawing on samples
from “convicted persons, arrested persons, unidentified remains, missing persons, and relatives of
missing persons”).
72
Heather Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case. Here’s What She’s Going to
Do Next., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/science/barbara-raeventer-gsk.html; see also Heather Murphy, Genealogy Sites Have Helped Identify Suspects. Now They’ve
Helped Convict One, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/us/dna-geneticgenealogy-trial.html (describing how genetic genealogy has “redefined the cutting edge of forensic
science”).
73
Heather Murphy, Coming Soon to a Police Station Near You: The DNA ‘Magic Box’, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/science/dna-crime-gene-technology.html.
74
See MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL, supra note 71, at 3–5.
75
Id. at 288–95.
76
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (CBS television broadcast 2000–2015).
77
DNA could potentially be used to establish paternity, Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of
Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 325, 365–70 (2005), to identify the alleged wrongdoer in an accident, DNA Evidence in a Personal
Injury
or
Accident
Claim,
MEINHART,
SMITH,
&
MANNING
PLLC,
https://www.bluegrassjustice.com/personal-injury/dna-evidence/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019), or to prove
cellular damage due to chemical exposure, Mark Hansen, DNA Poised to Show its Civil Side, A.B.A. J.
(Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/dna_poised_to_show_its_civil_side.
78
Some apartment buildings have required their dog owners to provide DNA samples from their
dog, so that when poop is found on the premises it can be linked to the proper dog and appropriate
measures can be taken. Danny Lewis, Dog Owners Beware, DNA in Dog Poop Could Be Used to Track
You Down, SMITHSONIAN (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/dog-ownersbeware-dna-dog-poop-could-used-track-you-down-180958596/.
79
See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO
MAKE IT RIGHT xv–xxiii, 359 (2003). While some might assume that law enforcement would jump at
the opportunity to use the most recent scientific tools, instead it seems that many police and prosecutors
are often resistant to the new approaches. DAVID A. HARRIS, FAILED EVIDENCE: WHY LAW
ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE 2 (2012) (“With the exception of DNA (and then, only sometimes),
most of our police and prosecutorial agencies do not welcome the findings of science; they do not rush
to incorporate the latest scientific advances into their work.”).
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We leave traces not only with our fingerprints and our DNA, but also in
other ways that scientists are beginning to track. For example, the particular
combination of bacteria hosted by each of us is fairly unique, and we leave
bacterial traces as we breathe, excrete, lose hairs, and so on.80 Thus, even
when rapists use gloves, masks, and condoms to protect against fingerprint
and DNA identification, they can potentially be identified through the
bacteria in the pubic hair they leave behind.81 Microbes left on keyboards,
phones, or shoes could also be used to identify suspects who did not leave
DNA or fingerprint traces.82 Further, scientists are developing the ability to
track our medical conditions through our sweat.83 Presumably, scientists will
continue to develop even more sophisticated means to follow our traces.
iii.

Tracking Our Movement

Today’s technology also allows us to track movement directly, through
technology installed in our devices or even potentially our bodies. For
example, when we make calls on our mobile phones, the signals bounce
between cell towers, thereby allowing technicians to trace the source of the
call.84 Phones can also be tracked directly through many applications.85 It
appears that some commercial companies86 and law enforcement87 are
80

Jarrad T. Hampton-Marcell et al., The Human Microbiome: An Emerging Tool in Forensics,
MICROBIAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY
(Feb.
27,
2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5328825/; Kai Kupferschmidt, How Your Microbiome
Can Put You at the Scene of the Crime, SCIENCE (Mar. 8, 2016, 9:45 AM),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/how-your-microbiome-can-put-you-scene-crime.
81
Dalmeet Singh Chawla, Bacteria on Pubic Hair Could Be Used to Identify Rapists, SCIENCE
(Dec. 15, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/12/bacteria-pubic-hair-could-beused-identify-rapists.
82
Ed Yong, Can the Microbes You Leave Behind Be Used to Identify You?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(May 11, 2015), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/phenomena/2015/05/11/can-themicrobes-you-leave-behind-be-used-to-identify-you/.
83
Apoorva Mandavilli, Your Sweat Will See You Now, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/health/wearable-tech-sweat.html.
84
Season 1 of the podcast Serial examines how this technology was used to convict Adnan Syed
of the murder of his former girlfriend. The Alibi, SERIAL (Oct. 3, 2014), https://serialpodcast.org/seasonone.
85
The iPhone, for example, allows persons to voluntarily provide others with access to their location
data. Locations Services & Privacy, APPLE (Mar. 25, 2019), https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT207056;
Track and Find Your Missing Apple Device, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/explore/find-my-iphoneipad-mac-watch (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). Android phones can also be tracked. Cara McGoogan,
Millions of Android Phones Could Be Tracked with Ultrasonic Spying Tool, TELEGRAPH (May 8, 2017,
11:36
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/05/08/millions-android-phones-couldtracked-ultrasonic-spying-tool/.
86
See Chirag Kulkarni, 15 Ways Geolocation Is Totally Changing Marketing, FORTUNE (Feb. 6,
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/06/geolocation-marketing/ (showing how companies use targeted
advertising to send customers advertisements based on their location).
87
Andy Greenberg, How the CIA Can Hack Your Phone, PC, and TV (Says Wikileaks), WIRED
(Mar. 7, 2017, 4:03 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/cia-can-hack-phone-pc-tv-says-wikileaks/;
Brad Heath, Police Secretly Track Cellphones to Solve Routine Crimes, USA TODAY (Aug. 24, 2015,
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already using such tracking tools, and it seems likely that this use will
increase exponentially in the future, though as in other contexts, courts will
have to wrestle with evidentiary and privacy issues.88
Phones are not the only method of tracking our whereabouts directly.
For example, in one case a man used his “Fitbit” data to support his alibi in
a murder investigation,89 and a woman’s “Fitbit” data was used to prove her
husband killed her.90 In addition, police can install tracking tools directly
onto cars,91 although that is beginning to look downright old-fashioned. In
the future, we can expect that people may even have tracking or
identification devices installed directly into their bodies, as we already do
for our pets.92 A Wisconsin tech company offered to install chips in
employees so they could easily enter the building and pay for cafeteria food
with a wave of the hand, and a majority of the employees voluntarily got the
chip.93
2. The Technology of What We Are or Were Thinking
The technology discussed above is amazing, but pales in comparison to
potentially using technology to get into peoples’ brains. Imagine the
implications for dispute resolution if we can figure out what people are
thinking or remembering, or whether they were under the influence of drugs
or alcohol.94 First, getting into peoples’ memories could give us an indirect
7:51
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police-stingray-cellsurveillance/31994181/.
88
In Carpenter v. United States, a five-to-four Supreme Court recently held that a warrant is needed
to access cell phone site location information. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
89
Kate Briquelet, My Fitbit Proves I Didn’t Kill Her, DAILY BEAST (June 6, 2017, 8:50 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/my-fitbit-proves-i-didnt-kill-her.
90
Kevin Maney, Busted by Your Fitbit: How Smart Devices Can Solve Crimes, NEWSWEEK (May
13, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/26/fitbit-smart-technology-smart-devicescrime-true-crime-amazon-echo-google-home-608410.html (giving examples of how fitness technology
that tracks movements can be used to solve crimes and confirm or disprove alibis).
91
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that police installation of a tracking
device on a car is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, thereby requiring police to obtain a warrant
prior to installation).
92
Microchipping
of
Animals
FAQ,
AVMA,
https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/FAQs/Pages/Microchipping-of-animals-FAQ.aspx (last visited
Aug. 29, 2019).
93
Maggie Astor, Microchip Implants for Employees? One Company Says Yes, N.Y. TIMES (July
25,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/technology/microchips-wisconsin-companyemployees.html.
94
See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1274–88 (2012)
(discussing how neuroscience and other means can be used to identify an unknown person and to
determine whether that person was under the influence of drugs or alcohol). Of course, the mere fact that
brain science can yield certain technical information does not mean that the use would be permitted by
law, including the U.S. Constitution. See Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV.
351, 400–07 (2012) (discussing how the use of such technical information could create Fourth and Fifth
Amendment issues).
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95

way to find out what actually happened. Perhaps this testing could even
reveal information that the witness or perpetrator does not consciously
remember or does not wish to reveal. Second, perhaps we could uncover
information regarding state of mind and intent, such as whether a person
acted knowingly, intentionally,96 reasonably,97 or maliciously,98 or the extent
to which a person suffered pain.99 While we cannot yet insert electrodes or
use other devices to learn exactly what is in someone’s brain, we are getting
closer to that point, for better or for worse.
i.

Technology That Indirectly Measures What People Are
Thinking

Invented in 1921 by John Augustus Larson,100 polygraph machines do
not tap directly into the subject’s brain, but rather measure physiological
responses such as blood pressure, pulse, and respiration on the theory that
giving false answers will cause the needle to move on these measures.101 The
accuracy of the polygraph has been hotly contested, as many contend that
nervous but honest subjects may incorrectly be found to be lying102 and that

95
Of course, to the extent we will be trying to use technology to access information from human
brains, we will need to deal with what computer programmers call the issue of “garbage in, garbage out.”
See
Garbage
In,
Garbage
Out,
FREE
DICTIONARY,
https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/garbage+in%2C+garbage+out (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). If
observer O thought they saw A kill B, they may remember A killed B. Yet, while the memory may be
clear, O’s initial perception may have been erroneous. And, even if O’s initial perception was accurate,
maybe O’s memory was not perfect or has become tainted.
96
On the criminal side, we generally require evidence of intent of crimes such as murder or theft or
battery. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Civilly, intent can be relevant to prove
discrimination or fraud. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that
discrimination claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause require a showing of intent).
97
Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the American
Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL
ISSUES 2010, at 203, 228 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011). But see Richard Restak, The Fiction of the
‘Reasonable
Man’,
WASH.
POST
(May
17,
1987),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1987/05/17/the-law-the-fiction-of-the-reasonableman/15dea8f3-521a-48d0-aba8-9e361774450e/?utm_term=.204d92d76957 (discussing that due to the
nature of our neurological structures, the “reasonableness” standard is unrealistic).
98
“Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s
evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
908(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
99
See, e.g., Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates
Moral Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801, 811 (2012).
100
NATHAN J. GORDON, ESSENTIALS OF POLYGRAPH AND POLYGRAPH TESTING 15 (2017).
101
Id.
102
Scott Lilienfeld, The Polygraph Test Strikes – and Strikes Out – Again, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July
21,
2009),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-skeptical-psychologist/200907/thepolygraph-test-strikes-and-strikes-out-again.
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103

cool liars can fool the test. As a result, polygraph results have been heavily
critiqued and are often not admissible in court.104
Efforts are under way to try to improve on the polygraph using other
tools that would also, indirectly, try to determine what someone is thinking.
For example, one company has been developing software intended to detect
lies by tracing eye movements.105 Other companies are exploring whether
voice recognition,106 analysis of facial expressions,107 or measurements of
body twitches108 may provide better insight into truthfulness. Some suggest
we are even getting to the point where robots can be used to measure
subjects’ truthfulness.109 While it seems unlikely any of these tools will give
completely reliable insights into subjects’ honesty, at least they give us a
sense where the science is heading.
ii.

Tap Directly into the Brain???

Scientists are also beginning to develop tools to try to tap directly into
someone’s brain, to see what the person is thinking or what they

103
See, e.g., DOUG WILLIAMS, HOW TO STING THE POLYGRAPH 2 (2014) (ebook),
https://ia600207.us.archive.org/29/items/WilliamsDougHowToStingThePolygraph/Williams%2C_Dou
g_-_How_to_Sting_the_Polygraph.pdf (discussing how to “beat[]” a polygraph test). The author Doug
Williams, a former police officer and polygraph examiner, served two years in jail for obstruction of
justice and mail fraud connected to his business of training people how to pass polygraph exams. See
Christina Sterbenz, This Ex-Cop Thinks Lie-Detector Tests Are So Inaccurate He’s Facing 100 Years in
Prison for Starting a Website That Taught People How to Cheat Them, BUS. INSIDER (May 18, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-crazy-story-of-an-ex-cop-who-ran-a-website-that-taught-peoplehow-to-cheat-polygraphs-2015-5; see also Mr. Lie Detector, THIS AM. LIFE (June 9, 2017),
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/618/mr-lie-detector.
104
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 317 (1998) (finding that excluding the evidentiary
admission of polygraph results did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights); Michael Stockdale
& Don Grubin, The Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in English Criminal Proceedings, 76 J. CRIM.
L. 232, 232 (2012) (discussing that while English and Commonwealth authority tend to find polygraph
evidence is inadmissible, the issue has not yet been decided by the English Court of Appeal).
105
Univ. of Utah, ‘You Can’t Hide Your Lyin’ Eyes’: Eye-Tracking Lie-Detection, PHYS.ORG (July
12, 2010), https://phys.org/news/2010-07-lyin-eyes-eye-tracking-lie-detection.html.
106
Susan Miller, When Everybody Lies: Voice-Stress Analysis Tackles Lie Detection, GCN (Mar.
18, 2014), https://gcn.com/articles/2014/03/18/voice-risk-analysis.aspx (discussing increasing use of
Computer Voice Stress Analysis tests including in criminal investigations).
107
Richard Gray, The App That Knows if You’re Lying: Online ‘Polygraph’ Uses Artificial
Intelligence to Study Your Face for Subtle Signs You’re Being Deceitful, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 12, 2016),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3395651/The-robot-knows-lying-Polygraph-poweredartificial-intelligence-studies-face-voice-subtle-signs-deceitful.html.
108
Ewen MacAskill, British and Dutch Researchers Develop New Form of Lie-Detector Test,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2015 12:16 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jan/04/british-dutchresearchers-new-form-lie-detector-test-polygraph.
109
See June Javelosa, New Lie-Detecting Robot Security Agent Could Help Secure Borders,
FUTURISM (Jan. 6, 2017), https://futurism.com/new-lie-detecting-robot-security-agent-could-helpsecure-borders/ (providing information on the Automated Virtual Agent for Truth Assessments in Real
Time (AVATAR) and its ability to identify signs of lying and discomfort in travelers at borders using
eye-detection software and motion and pressure sensors).
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remember. The best known such tool is currently the fMRI—functional
magnetic resonance imaging—a tool that “measures small and variable
changes in the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated blood in the brain when
a particular task is performed or stimulus presented.”111 While the fMRI does
not directly reveal thoughts or memories, some have suggested that it can
effectively be used to measure whether someone is telling the truth. For
example, a person can be shown pictures or asked questions while electrodes
are attached to their head to measure reactions. By looking at which areas of
the brain “light up” due to a higher presence of oxygenated blood, scientists
may hypothesize whether the subject was previously familiar with a certain
picture or words and whether or not the subject is lying when they make
certain statements.112 Moreover, some researchers are even trying to compile
what one commentator has called a “dictionary” of sorts for individual
subjects, using fMRI technology to determine what the subject was thinking
about at the time they were tested.113 Advocates of this new technology
contend that it is more reliable than polygraphs because brain waves and
cerebral blood flow are arguably less subject to control than blood pressure
and heart rate.114 While both courts and scientists have generally agreed that
the probative value of the fMRI is not yet sufficient to allow its use in
court,115 one can foresee a day when such technology might contribute to
dispute resolution.

110

See generally The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience, VAND.
U., www.lawneuro.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2019), a website created by The MacArthur Foundation
Research Network on Law and Neuroscience.
111
Anthony D. Wagner et al., fMRI and Lie Detection: A Knowledge Brief of the MacArthur
Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience 1 (Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 17-10,
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2881586. See generally Stacey Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and
the Law: Trends and Directions for Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44, 44–56 (2007) (discussing
the use of neuroimaging and the law).
112
Wagner et al., supra note 111, at 1.
113
For example, fMRI studies have been done to try to determine which of several images the
person was thinking about, or which of several videos they had watched. MARC JONATHAN BLITZ,
SEARCHING MINDS BY SCANNING BRAINS: NEUROSCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVACY PROTECTION 56–57 (2017).
114
Mark Peplow, Brain Imaging Could Spot Liars, NATURE (Nov. 29, 2004),
https://www.nature.com/news/2004/041129/full/news041129-1.html.
115
For example, in United States v. Semrau, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district
court did not err in failing to admit fMRI expert testimony the defense sought to introduce to prove the
defendant was telling the truth. 693 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Michael Laris, Debate on
Brain Scans as Lie Detectors Highlighted in Maryland Murder Trial, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/debate-on-brain-scans-as-lie-detectors-highlighted-inmaryland-murder-trial/2012/08/26/aba3d7d8-ed84-11e1-9ddc-340d5efb1e9c_story.html
(discussing
murder case, State v. Smith, in which a Maryland judge refused to admit fMRI evidence defense counsel
claimed should prove their client was being truthful); Alexis Madrigal, Brain Scan Evidence Rejected by
Brooklyn Court, WIRED (May 5, 2010, 5:08 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/05/fmri-in-court-update/
(explaining the court’s exclusion of fMRI evidence in an employer-retaliation case).
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Another form of brain technology, sometimes referred to as “brain
fingerprinting,”116 may be even more promising. This technique studies
brain waves emitted when persons are exposed to certain familiar stimuli,
such as images that would be known only to a guilty person.117 Thus, rather
than directly testing whether a person is telling the truth, it aims to determine
whether the subject is familiar with certain information that would be known
only to the perpetrator.118 For example, in the Steven Avery case, made
famous in the Making a Murderer television documentary,119 Dr. Larry
Farwell opined based on this test that Mr. Avery did not know specific
information regarding where the victim was killed.120 Dr. Farwell claims that
the technology has successfully been used both to convict a serial killer121
and to free a man who had been wrongfully convicted.122 However, as with
the fMRI, “brain fingerprinting” is not yet generally accepted by either
courts or researchers. 123
Other brain-reading technology exists as well. A tool called functional
near infrared imaging (fNIR) produces maps of brain activity similar to those
produced by the fMRI, but without having to place the subject in a tubular

116

See generally Larry Farwell, Brain Fingerprinting: Detection of Concealed Information, in
WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCE (A. Jamieson & A.A. Moenssens eds., 2014).
117
The technique, also known as a “concealed information” or “guilty knowledge” test, MARC
JONATHAN BLITZ, SEARCHING MINDS BY SCANNING BRAINS: NEUROSCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTION 48–49 (2017), relies on electroencephalography (EEG) to
measures subjects’ responses using a P300—a particular measurable brainwave. See Alexandra J.
Roberts, Everything New is Old Again: Brain Fingerprinting and Evidentiary Analogy, 9 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 234, 260–64 (2007) (describing author’s personal experience being tested by Dr. Farwell). Dr.
Farwell’s later research shows that the P300 is a piece of a larger response, which he labeled MERMER–
Memory and Encoding Related Multifaceted Electroencephalography. Id. at 260.
118
Dr. Larry Farwell claims to have invented this technology. See Larry Farwell, Farwell Brain
Fingerprinting: A New Paradigm in Criminal Justice and Counterterrorism, FARWELL BRAIN
FINGERPRINTING, https://larryfarwell.com/brain-fingerprinting-executive-summary-dr-larry-farwell-drlawrence-farwell.html (last visited July 28, 2018). But others have also been exploring the use of P300
brainwaves to provide an alternative to the polygraph. Virginia Hughes, The Other Polygraph, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 30, 2014), http://phenomena.nationalgeographic.com/2014/09/30/the-otherpolygraph/.
119
Making a Murderer (Netflix 2015).
120
Notice of Motion & Motion for Post-Conviction Relief Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 974.06 & 805.15
at 144–55, Wisconsin v. Avery, No. 05-CF-1381 (Wis. Ct. App. June 17, 2017).
121
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Farwell et al., Brain Fingerprinting Field Studies Comparing P300MERMER and P300 Brainwave Responses in the Detection of Concealed Information, 7 COGNITIVE
NEURODYNAMICS 263, 263 (2013); see also Roberts, supra note 117, at 257–64.
122
For a detailed discussion of the case, see Roberts, supra note 117, at 264–65 (explaining that
after testing confirmed defendant’s version of events, the primary prosecution witness recanted his
testimony).
123
See, e.g., Lyn M. Gaudet, Note, Brain Fingerprinting, Scientific Evidence, and Daubert: A
Cautionary Lesson from India, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 293, 306 (2011) (commenting on the fact that fMRIs
are not generally accepted by courts or researchers).
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124

scanner. Also, electroencephalography (EEG) technology has been used
for many years to measure rhythms of electrical brain activity, and perhaps
may advance to yield more specific information.125 Additional potential
tools include Positron Emission Tomography and Singe Photon Emission
Computer Tomography scanning, which also measure blood flow in the
brain.126
In short, while we are not yet able to tap directly into brains to pull out
memories or intentions, it does seem clear that we are on this road and that
neurologists will increasingly be called upon to help resolve legal disputes.
We can also be confident that many technical,127 legal,128 and
philosophical129 issues will be raised as to the evidentiary use of neurological
findings. For the purposes of this Article, however, the most significant
issues are the extent to which we can solve legal conundrums by obtaining
information from technological sources, the limits of the technology, and
how these technological advances should affect our dispute resolution
system. We now turn to these questions.

124
BLITZ, supra note 117, at 4 (citing Hasan Ayaz et al., Using Maze Suite and Functional Near
Infrared Spectroscopy to Study Learning in Spatial Navigation, 56 J. VISUALIZED EXPERIMENTS 1, 1
(2011)).
125
Id. at 4–5, 45–55.
126
Id. at 54–55; see also MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW:
THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE xxii–xxv (2013) (briefly explaining
MRI, fMRI, EEG, and other neuroscience technology).
127
See, e.g., Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging for Lie
Detection: Where Science, Law and Policy Collide, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 222, 222 (2013)
(discussing how science needs to advance to support reliability of fMRI results); Frederick Schauer, Can
Bad Science be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191,
1192 (2010) (suggesting that scientific results that do not meet scientists’ criteria for reliability may
nonetheless be appropriate to admit at trial in certain situations).
128
Regarding potential constitutional issues, see, e.g., BLITZ, supra note 117, at 59–60 (discussing
neuroimaging and the Fifth Amendment); Dov Fox, Will Memory Detection Technology Transform
Criminal Justice in the U.S.? Brain Imaging and the Bill of Rights, 8 AM . J. BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2008)
(examining Fourth and Fifth Amendment implications of admitting neuroscience evidence); Francis X.
Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 692–707 (2013)
(same).
129
See generally 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, DISEASE,
AND DEVELOPMENT (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008) (discussing topics including “Internalism and
the Evidence form Pathology”); PARDO & PATTERSON, supra note 126, at 179–207 (discussing
implications of neuroscience for theories of criminal punishment); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on
the
Stand,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Mar.
11,
2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html (discussing the philosophy behind
using neuroscience in the American legal system).
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II. NOT SO QUICK—OUR NEW TECHNOLOGY WILL NOT NECESSARILY
BRING US TRUTH OR JUSTICE
A. New Technology Will Not Bring Us Indisputable Truth
1. Challenges to Recording and Presenting the Truth
The science outlined above is amazing, but it will never deliver an
indisputable truth, even if such truth exists. First, as a matter of logistics, it
is difficult to imagine a world in which our technology will be so
ever-present that it delivers information on all issues. Even if we were to
have cameras virtually everywhere; collect everyone’s fingerprints, retinal
scans, and DNA; track everyone’s phones and computers; and tap into
everyone’s brain, some event might be missed or incorrectly recorded.
Second, even to the extent that technology records an event or evaluates
a brain, it will not resolve all issues.130 In fact, in 2009 the National Academy
of Science published a study showing that forensic sciences, for the most
part, were not reliable.131 The study found that while DNA analyses could
be quite effective, other popular tests including fingerprints, hair, and bullets
often were not valid.132 One fundamental problem is that despite popular
belief, even fingerprints and retinal scans have not been proven to be unique,
much less bullet traces or footprints. As several commentators have
suggested, excepting DNA, “[a]lthough individualization is the centerpiece
of numerous forensic science subfields, . . . no theoretical or empirical basis
for individualization exists, and none is likely to come into being in the
foreseeable future.”133 Further, although analysts have found that DNA
130
See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 869,
869 (2018) (questioning courts’ ability to figure out which technology works and suggesting the use of
an independent commission to aid courts in this endeavor); Jonathan J. Koehler, How Trial Judges Should
Think About Forensic Science Evidence, 102 JUDICATURE 28, 36 (2018) (urging that there are compelling
reasons to be concerned about the quality of many categories of forensic evidence and that courts are
failing to adequately evaluate and deal with these problems).
131
COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 87 (2009); see also
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS
142 (2016) (offering trial judges guidance on how to determine the scientific reliability of proffered
forensic evidence).
132
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra
note 131, at 67–123. Indeed, the 2009 National Academy of Science Report leads one to question whether
these familiar types of evidence comply with the evidentiary standards set out by the Supreme Court in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring judges to determine
whether expert evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admissible).
133
Saks & Faigman, Failed Forensics, supra note 37, at 154–56. We have also seen that some of
our technology may be more effective at identifying white men than women or members of other racial
or ethnic groups. See, e.g., Joy Buolamwini, When the Robot Doesn’t See Dark Skin, N.Y. TIMES (June
21,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/facial-analysis-technology-bias.html
(describing gender and racial bias demonstrated in tests of facial analysis technology); Steve Lohr, Facial
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forensics has the potential to be much more accurate than the other
methods,134 it is also clear that mistakes can be made in DNA testing thereby
leading to serious errors.135 At most, DNA can deliver results within certain
probabilistic ranges, but false negatives and false positives are always
possible.136 Moreover, one recent study even showed that a person’s DNA
could be changed by giving that person a bone marrow transplant.137
Third, evidence can be faked, whether by prosecutors, investigators, or
other parties.138 DNA or bacteria can be planted139 or improperly analyzed,140
videos, audio, and photos can be altered,141 and presumably even brain scans
Recognition is Accurate, if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html
(noting problem Google faced in 2015 when its image-recognition photo app labeled African Americans
as gorillas).
134
E.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 37, at 47.
135
The National Research Council has twice done in-depth studies on DNA testing and laboratory
procedures, resulting in a series of recommendations to put in place protocols and procedures to ensure
that the science is used properly. See Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic
Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 965–66 (2008) (discussing research of
the National Research Council); see also Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science:
The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 187–91, 208–20 (2007) (discussing serious
lapses in Houston DNA lab while also generally noting that DNA can be far more reliable than other
forms of forensic science and is now often effectively regulated).
136
See, e.g., Marina Medvin, Framed by Your Own Cells: How DNA Evidence Imprisons the
Innocent, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marinamedvin/2018/09/20/framed-byyour-own-cells-how-dna-evidence-imprisons-the-innocent/#582b985a4b86 (explaining how DNA
evidence can be used against innocent people).
137
Heather Murphy, When a DNA Test Says You’re a Younger Man, Who Lives 5,000 Miles Away,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/07/us/dna-bone-marrow-transplantcrime-lab.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share.
138
As will be discussed, investigators may also inadvertently misinterpret scientific evidence. See
infra text accompanying notes 178–82.
139
See, e.g., Caitlin Flynn, Did Mark Fuhrman Plant Evidence in the O.J. Simpson Case? He
Evoked
the
Fifth
Amendment
in
Court,
BUSTLE
(Mar.
29,
2016),
https://www.bustle.com/articles/150655-did-mark-fuhrman-plant-evidence-in-the-oj-simpson-case-heevoked-the-fifth-amendment-in (discussing whether Mark Fuhrman planted the infamous white glove in
the O.J. Simpson case); Julia Jacobo, Baltimore Police Sergeant Planted Drugs in Suspect’s Car, Federal
Prosecutors Say, ABC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/US/baltimore-police-sergeantplanted-drugs-suspects-car-federal/story?id=51492675 (reporting on a Baltimore police officer’s
indictment for planting heroin in a car). The Making a Murderer Netflix series also included an allegation
that the police had removed blood from a syringe in the evidence locker and then used that blood to try
to implicate defendant Steven Avery. Making a Murderer: Indefensible (Netflix 2015).
140
See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert Witnesses,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1500–01 (2007) (discussing work of prosecution expert whose remarkable
ability to secure convictions was apparently based on improper science).
141
In 2018, the Trump White House was accused of putting out a video that had allegedly been
tampered with to justify revoking the press credentials of CNN reporter Jim Acosta. Drew Harwell, White
House Shares Doctored Video to Support Punishment of Journalist Jim Acosta, WASH. POST (Nov. 8,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/11/08/white-house-shares-doctored-videosupport-punishment-journalist-jim-acosta. As well, a faked video of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was
slowed down to make her appear drunk. Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to Make Her Appear
Drunk,
Spread
Across
Social
Media,
WASH.
POST
(May
24,
2019),
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can be tampered with. While technical means may be devised to try to guard
against or detect such chicanery,142 it seems that at least historically human
ingenuity and capacity for deception have inevitably found ways to thrive.
Fourth, even with the most impressive technology, superior wealth and
advocacy will likely make a difference. As Marc Galanter explained many
years ago, it seems that the “haves” always come out ahead.143 This will
remain true in our future more heavily technological world in both the civil
and criminal context.144 Wealthier disputants will have greater access to
technology, and those with more resources will be able to hire superior
advocates and better experts, and thereby better protect their interests.145
Finally, as is discussed below, it is not possible to consider technological
evidence without also raising psychological and even philosophical
concerns. Our science, good as it may become, will never stand
independently from the humans who both create the technology and then
interpret the results.146 Yet, we humans will inevitably bring to bear our

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-videos-slowed-make-herappear-drunk-spread-across-social-media. One new tool is Adobe’s Project VoCo, software being
developed to allow for the manipulation of video and audio. Zeyu Jin et al., VoCo: Text-based Insertion
and Replacement in Audio Narration, 36 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON GRAPHICS 1, 1 (2017). This
technology essentially allows for the equivalent of “photoshopping” of audios and videos—substituting
in new words and even actions. See, e.g., Kevin Roose, Here Come the Fake Videos, Too, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
4,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/technology/fake-videos-deepfakes.html
(explaining how videos can be altered); Olivia Solon, The Future of Fake News: Don’t Believe
Everything
You
Read,
See
or
Hear,
GUARDIAN
(July
26,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/26/fake-news-obama-video-trump-face2facedoctored-content (explaining how content can be altered).
142
Seeing Isn’t Believing: The Fact Checker’s Guide to Manipulated Video, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/politics/fact-checker/manipulated-videoguide/?wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1 (last visited Jan. 6, 2020).
143
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 124–25 (1974); see also WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH 62 (1998)
(stating that our justice system tends to favor “sophisticated or wealthy suspects”).
144
See Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 911, 914 (2011–12) (discussing that prosecutors often prevail simply because they have
more resources); Findley, Innocents at Risk, supra note 135, at 898 (stating that defendants tend to be
disadvantaged by disparities and imbalances between parties with regard to discovery, ability, access to
resources, etc.).
145
See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 81
(Princeton Univ. Press 1973) (1949) (observing that “frequently the partisanship of the opposing lawyers
blocks the uncovering of vital evidence or . . . distorts it”); Frankel, supra note 13, at 1052 (contending
that the adversary system places too much emphasis on contentiousness and too little on truth); see also
PIZZI, supra note 143, at 25–45, 140–54 (urging that we focus too much on procedural rights and not
enough on defendants’ access to adequate representation).
146
ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE, at xvii–xx (2015)
(explaining how the psychology of decision making too often contaminates our criminal investigative
systems); DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 1–8 (2012)
(explaining why current investigative techniques such as interviews, confessions, and lineups are so
prone to produce erroneous results).
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human psyches and biases. Moreover, we must consider the serious question
of what it means to find “truth.”
2. But Is There Really a Truth?
Many twentieth century scholars from disciplines such as philosophy,
linguistics, sociology, and psychology have urged that truth-finding is
rooted inevitably in our own subjectivity. As noted legal scholar Mirjan
Damaška has explained, such philosophical and psychological critiques pose
problems for any system of justice aimed at discovering the truth, and
particularly for trials:
One of the working assumptions of the practice of adjudication
is that truth is in principle discoverable, and that accuracy in
fact-finding constitutes a precondition for a just decision. But
influential currents of contemporary thought are skeptical of
truth as a philosophical principle, and they doubt that the
acquisition of objective knowledge is possible.147
As co-author of a book on lawyering and psychology,148 I appreciate that
even the most seemingly objective facts are subject to challenge from a
psychological perspective. Humans are inevitably influenced by our prior
knowledge and cannot help but perceive,149 remember,150 and process151 new
information in light of that which is already stored within our brains.152
When the internet almost blew up because people were disputing whether a
dress was white or blue,153 or whether a voice had said “yanny” or
“laurel,”154 we saw that things that are obviously true to us may not be

147
Mirjan Damaška, Truth in Adjudication, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289, 289 (1998). Damaška discusses,
for example, the post-modernist views of Hayden White, the social construction theories of John Searle,
“coherence theory,” “correspondence” theory, and “convergence” theory. Id. at 290–93; see also Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM .
& MARY L. REV. 5, 14 (1996) (discussing philosophers, literary critics, art critics, feminist theorists,
linguistics, and others who have questioned existence of a knowable stable truth and arguing that the
non-adversarial approaches may be best in a world where truth is unknowable).
148
See generally JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS:
UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING (2012)
(urging lawyers to draw on cognitive and social psychology to represent their clients more effectively).
149
Id. at 7–27 (discussing psychology of perception).
150
Id. at 29–43 (discussing psychology of memory).
151
Id. at 67–83 (discussing psychology of judgment).
152
Id. at 34 (discussing that our memory is colored by information we already have in our minds).
153
Jonathan Corum, Is That Dress White and Gold or Blue and Black?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/02/28/science/white-or-bluedress.html.
154
Rachel Gutman, A Linguist Explains Why ‘Laurel’ Sounds Like ‘Yanny’, ATLANTIC (May 15,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/05/dont-rest-on-your-laurels/560483/.
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obviously true to others. Thus, there is great reason to believe that advocates,
investigators, and neutrals may all fall prey to preexisting biases.155
One human error that frequently comes into play is “confirmation
bias”—also called “tunnel vision”156 or more generally, “observer bias.”157
As commentator Michael Risinger puts it, “[a]n elementary principle of
modern psychology is that the desires and expectations people possess
influence their perceptions and interpretations of what they observe.”158
Such preconceptions frequently connect to racial and ethnic biases, such as
when (as was recently reported) security guards assumed that an African
American woman could not possibly belong in a Yale dorm lounge.159
Nonetheless, while I appreciate that truth is both elusive and often
illusory, I am not ready to reject the truth-finding quest altogether. Socially
constructed as our world may be, I am still confident we can at least
sometimes find that a light was either red or green at a particular moment in
time, that Person A did or did not stab Person B, or even that a product did
or did not comply with relevant design criteria.160 That is, I share Mirjan
Damaška’s conclusion that it is appropriate to search for truth in the legal
context, even while recognizing the challenges. He states, “the cultivation
of truth-values remains important for all adjudication,”161 explaining that
even though adjudicators may not be able to acquire objective knowledge

155
See, e.g., Mirjan Damaška, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1083, 1092–1106 (1975) (discussing psychological factors likely to lead both lawyer advocates and
judges to stray from the truth); Dan Simon et al., Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Investigations: An
Experiment 17 (May 15, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401723 (finding,
in experiment, that assigning person to role, whether as attorney or as investigator, significantly impacted
their perspective on disputed “facts”).
156
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292–95 (2006); see also Kent Roach, Forensic Science and Miscarriages
of Justice: Some Lessons from a Comparative Experience, 50 JURIMETRICS 67, 81–82 (2009) (discussing
need to insulate crime labs from dangers of confirmation bias).
157
D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic
Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13 n.52 (2002).
158
Id. at 6.
159
Christina Caron, A Black Yale Student Was Napping, and a White Student Called the Police,
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/nyregion/yale-black-studentnap.html. Scientists in a variety of fields have recognized the existence of such biases, and some have
endeavored to structure their own research to correct for such preconceptions. Risinger et al., supra note
157, at 8 (discussing observer effects in various scientific fields including in the work of Isaac Newton
and Gregor Mendel).
160
Cf. Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System, supra note 147, at 17–18 (pointing
out that a single truth is hardest to find for disputes that are complex and polycentric rather than binary
in nature).
161
Damaška, Truth in Adjudication, supra note 147, at 289–90 (“[W]hile ‘post-modern’ thought
may be usefully unsettling for some intellectual pursuits, it is of little use in evidence law.”).
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independent of human beliefs, they only need “to establish events and
phenomena in the socially created world.”162
The implications of this perspective for the new technology discussed in
this Article are nuanced. Given human frailties, we want our new technology
to help us contend with some of the truth-finding problems that are inherent
in human perception, memory, and analysis. Yet, whether we are
considering photos, videos, retinal scans, DNA, or any other technology, it
turns out that the science does not “speak for itself.” Rather, investigators,
judges, jurors, mediators, or members of the community are all human, and
thus view, process, and remember information, technological or not, through
human filters. We cannot use technology to escape human subjectivity after
all.163
Indeed, the fact that technology may seem to reveal a single truth is more
dangerous than the problems we faced in earlier times, when we were more
obviously dependent on flawed evidence such as eyewitness testimony. We
tend to trust our eyes and our ears.164 Yet, as Supreme Court Justice
Benjamin Cardozo put the matter: “We may try to see things as objectively
as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our
own.”165 So, the technology lures us with apparent objectivity but can never
deliver on that promise.
Several recent controversies show how human psychology has impacted
the interpretation of seemingly indisputable video evidence. In Scott v.
Harris, eight Supreme Court Justices famously relied on their own viewing
of a police dash cam video of a car chase to conclude that the plaintiff could
not possibly prevail on his claim that the police used excessive force.166
Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote in the majority opinion, “[w]e are happy to
allow the videotape to speak for itself.”167 However, Supreme Court Justice
162

Id. at 292. See also PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 13 (1966) (distinguishing reality from
knowledge); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 1–2 (1995) (distinguishing
“brute” facts such as the existence of Mt. Everest from “institutional” or socially constructed facts such
as the existence of money).
163
See SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 146, at 2 (“One of the obvious features of the criminal justice
process is that it is operationalized mostly through people: witnesses, detectives, suspects, lawyers,
judges, and jurors.”).
164
See generally NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 8 (2009) (discussing perceived objectivity
and impartiality of images); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125
HARV. L. REV. 683, 689–92 (2012) (discussing the seductive power of images, in that they seem pure
but nonetheless frame worldviews).
165
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 1 J.L. 329, 331 (2011). See also Itiel
E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications,
156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 74 (2006) (arguing that forensic science fields are not as objective as they
should be).
166
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374, 378–81, 386 (2007).
167
Id. at 378 n.5.
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Stevens watched the same video and came to a different conclusion, as did
the district court judge and three judges on the court of appeals.168 Inspired
by the Justices’ disparate views, and Justice Scalia’s assertion that the video
spoke for itself, researchers conducted a study looking at how 1350 people
of diverse backgrounds would view the video at issue in Scott v. Harris.169
They found that “members of various subcommunities” tended to view the
facts differently than had the eight Justices.170 Specifically,
“African-Americans, low-income workers and residents of the Northeast . .
. tended to form more pro-plaintiff views of the facts than did the Court,” as
did “individuals who characterized themselves as liberals and
Democrats.”171 While we may not be able to say one group is more “right”
than the other, studies like these show that perception and cognition can be
“motivated” by one’s prior beliefs and experiences.172
One does not need to look far to find additional real-world examples of
this same phenomenon. Viewing video of a demonstration at the Lincoln
Memorial in 2019, some saw white high school students disrespect a Native
American elder and others saw the white high school students being
disrespected by other protesters.173 In other examples, did a police body cam
video show that the minority group member engaged in a threatening
gesture?174 Did footage of the demonstrations in Charleston, South Carolina
168
Id. at 389. Justice Stevens opined that he viewed the video differently because he had more
experience than the other Justices driving on country roads. Id. at 390 n.1.
169
Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 854 (2009).
170
Id. at 841.
171
Id.
172
See also Howard M. Wasserman, Mixed Signals on Summary Judgment, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1331, 1337 (“[V]ideo cannot, as Scott insisted and Plumhoff assumed, speak for itself. What video
actually says depends on a number of different considerations—who and what is depicted, who created
the images, and details of the images themselves (such as length, clarity, lighting, distance, angle, scope,
steadiness, quality).”). In the laboratory, psychologists have performed many studies that show
perception is linked to prior beliefs. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive
Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 853 (2012) (explaining how a
student’s loyalty to their institution shaped how they viewed and interpreted a video); Avani Mehta Sood
& John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Criminalization Goals, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
1313, 1336, 1340 (2012) (discussing how personal beliefs influenced the participant’s reported
perceptions).
173
Michael Miller, A Tribal Elder and a High School Junior Stood Face to Face, and the World
Reacted, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/a-tribal-elder-and-a-highschool-junior-stood-face-to-face-and-the-world-reacted/ar-BBSwlbl. See also Christine Emba, What a
Dead Samurai Can Teach Us About the Covington Controversy, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-a-dead-samurai-can-teach-us-about-the-covingtoncontroversy/2019/01/24/eeddee12-201d-11e9-8e21-59a09ff1e2a1_story.html?utm_term=.61aefa5aa3a3
(describing how the incident can be viewed from four different perspectives).
174
Timothy Williams et al., Police Body Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html (last updated Apr. 1,
2016). See also Vivian Yee & Kirk Johnson, Body Cameras Worn by Police Officers are No ‘Safeguard
of
Truth,’
Experts
Say,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
6,
2014),
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over removal of the Robert E. Lee statue show that protestors and
counter-protestors engaged in similar acts of violence?175 Did a video of a
purported confession show the confession was made voluntarily?176
Opinions will be shaped by prior knowledge and opinions, the portion of
video one watches, and the physical perspective from which the video is
taken.177
This same psychology impacts our review of other scientific evidence
as well as videos. In 2004, the FBI was called-in to help solve a train
bombing that had occurred in Madrid, Spain.178 Three expert FBI fingerprint
analysts all erroneously confirmed that a partial print found on a plastic bag
in a car containing bomb-related materials was a “100% match” for the print
of Oregon attorney Brandon Mayfield, who happened to be Muslim.179
Mayfield, whose prints were available because of his prior military service
and an arrest years earlier,180 was detained for several weeks before he was
ultimately released when Spanish authorities found the actual perpetrator,
also using fingerprint evidence.181 Subsequent studies showed how and why
the presumably well-meaning FBI agents fell prey to psychological biases,
such as the confirmation bias discussed above, that led them to make
significant mistakes.182 Researchers have identified many similar
investigatory errors by a variety of investigative bodies.183

https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/nyregion/body-cameras-worn-by-police-officers-are-nosafeguard-of-truth-experts-say.html (stating that body camera footage is not always decisive).
175
Jacey Fortin, The Statue at the Center of Charlottesville’s Storm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-rally-protest-statue.htm.
176
G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Evaluating Videotaped Confessions: Expertise Provides No Defense
Against the Camera-Perspective Effect, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 224, 224–26 (2007).
177
FAN, supra note 52, at 15 (“How the camera is positioned, and how people are framed, can
influence our perceptions of what is happening.”); Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body
Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 948 (2017) (“While the camera seems to be an unbiased
eye, camera perspective can powerfully shape viewer judgments . . . .”).
178
Sarah Kershaw et al., Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (June 5,
2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/05/us/spain-and-us-at-odds-on-mistaken-terror-arrest.html.
179
HARRIS, supra note 79, at 3–5.
180
Id. at 3.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 3–5; Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and the Need to Regulate Crime Labs, supra note
135, at 203–05, 221–22; Saks & Faigman, Failed Forensics, supra note 37, at 158.
183
Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (finding that prosecution forensic experts had given invalid
testimony, such as by misstating empirical data, in sixty percent of studied wrongful conviction cases).
See generally Dan Simon, Minimizing Error and Bias in Death Investigations, 49 SETON HALL L. REV.
255, 255–58 (2019) (exploring the effect of confirmation bias on death investigations and proposing
solutions).
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B. Justice Involves More than Truth
Although current U.S. commentators tend to emphasize the centrality of
truth-finding to justice, systems of justice across time and around the world,
have recognized that justice involves more than truth.
1. Trials
While trials, as discussed, focus substantially on truth,184 they also focus
on many non-truth issues. For example, we use trials to determine
appropriate remedies, provide disputants with procedural justice, educate the
public, and consider a variety of monetary and non-monetary goals and
costs.
i.

Remedies

Even assuming the truth of an alleged crime or civil infraction were
known, prosecutors, judges, jurors, or other decisionmakers would need to
determine appropriate remedies. In criminal cases, remedial determinations
may include consideration of historical truth, but inevitably also involve
assessments of motive, emotion, predictions of future conduct, and state of
mind. For example, as prosecutors offer plea bargains or propose sentences,
they may consider what resolution would best help a wrongdoer reintegrate
into society.185 Similarly, once a defendant is found guilty in a criminal trial,
a sentencing judge typically considers such factors as the defendant’s prior
criminal record, family history, state of mind, acceptance of responsibility,
and potential positive contributions to society. These factors are typically
considered relevant to sentencing,186 and to whether the defendant should be
ordered or allowed to commence drug treatment or other programs.187
Particularly given the problems and costs of mass incarceration,188 more and
184

See supra Section II.A.
Julie A. Lumpkin, The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish That a Defendant Has
Materially Breached A Plea Agreement, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1987) (explaining that plea
bargaining facilitates rehabilitation).
186
See, e.g., Andrea Avila, Consideration of Rehabilitative Factors for Sentencing in Federal
Courts: Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011), 92 NEB. L. REV. 404, 405–10 (2013) (discussing
the decline of the rehabilitative model of punishment and the implementation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines); Kathleen Landis, Determinate Sentencing and the Rise of Alternative Sanctions: Does
Shame Meet the Goals of Sentencing Reform?, 55 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 243, 256–63 (2017) (discussing
factors that might lead a judge to impose community service rather than more conventional punishments).
187
CYNTHIA ALKON & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME: PLEA BARGAINING,
PROBLEM SOLVING, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT 275–406 (2019) (discussing
problem solving courts and therapeutic justice).
188
See, e.g., GREG BERMAN & JULIAN ADLER, START HERE: A ROAD MAP TO REDUCING MASS
INCARCERATION 4–12 (2018) (discussing the “negative effects of incarceration” and how to lessen them);
Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 431–36 (2013) (discussing
the “[b]roader [h]arms of [m]ass [i]ncarceration”); see generally JACOB KANG-BROWN ET AL., THE NEW
DYNAMICS OF MASS INCARCERATION (2018) (providing updated insights on the mass incarceration
phenomenon).
185
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more U.S. jurisdictions are beginning to implement programs, at least for
minor crimes, that allow judges to take more creative approaches to
sentencing.189 Sometimes these jurisdictions establish “problem solving
courts” geared to reintegrate offenders back into the community190 after
helping with underlying issues including drugs, mental health, and veterans’
experiences. These broader kinds of factors are also relevant as parole
boards consider whether convicted jailed criminals should be released back
into society.191
With regard to civil remedies, judges and juries may sometimes consider
whether an appropriate remedy is necessary not only to compensate a
wronged plaintiff, but also to punish a defendant or deter other potential
defendants from engaging in similar behavior.192 Remedies may involve
monetary payments, but sometimes include non-monetary injunctions or
declarations of law as well. Policy concerns, fairness, and morality often
enter into such remedial determinations.193
ii.

Procedural Justice

We also consider issues other than truth in trials to the extent we
endeavor to provide what social psychologists have called “procedural
justice.”194 Specifically, researchers have found that people greatly value
being provided with an opportunity to voice their concerns, be treated with
dignity, and have a perceived neutral third party consider their
perspectives.195 While we generally focus on how best to provide procedural
189
See How Can America Reduce Mass Incarceration?, FRESH AIR PODCAST (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/06/636046653/how-can-america-reduce-mass-incarceration (discussion
regarding “alternatives to jail, including community service, social services and even personal essays”).
190
See, e.g., GREG BERMAN ET AL., GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE 31–
33 (2005) (defining problem solving courts and describing their use); DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE ET AL.,
NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS
AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2016) (reviewing problem solving
courts); Jessica K. Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1579, 1580–
81 (2018) (discussing uses of problem solving courts).
191
See Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole
Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 579–80 (1994) (discussing multiple factors considered in parole decisions).
192
See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (explaining that
“[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition”).
193
See generally MARTHA MINOW, WHEN SHOULD LAW FORGIVE? (2019) (discussing whether and
when legal institutions and legal officials should promote forgiveness rather than punishment).
194
See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 1–5 (1988); Paul G. Chevigny, Lind & Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Fairness, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1211 (1989) (book review).
195
See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE
RESEARCH IN LAW 65 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001); Laurens Walker et al., Reactions
of Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 295 (1974). See
generally Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution
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justice to the immediate disputants, these same factors may sometimes lead
us to allow victims or others to participate in trials as well, so they too can
feel heard. 196 Thus, even if technology provided the truth of what had
happened, there would be other issues to consider in setting up trials.
iii.

Education and Communal Values

Trials can also serve societal purposes, such as educating the public as
to rules and values, forming or maintaining communal bonds, and allowing
affected persons or community members to express their emotions. For
example, one of the earliest trials that was written about, albeit mythical,
involved Orestes’s killing of his mother, Clytemnestra.197 Orestes’s father,
Agamemnon, had sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia and then abducted
another woman, Cassandra, to become his concubine. Orestes’s mother,
understandably displeased with this turn of events, killed Agamemnon when
he returned home. Orestes then killed his mother to avenge her killing of his
father, leaving the Gods to decide what should now happen to Orestes.
Should he be punished for his act? To resolve the matter, the goddess Athena
set up a trial at which Athenian citizens would decide Orestes’s fate.198 The
purpose of this trial was not to ascertain truth or facts, which were known to
all, but rather to decide whether the killing was justified. After much
discussion, the jury split evenly, but Athena broke the tie by voting in favor
of Orestes.199 By holding the trial in public, Athena hoped to calm those gods
who had been angered by the killing, and the trial also served to air citizens’
concerns over the events.200

Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549
(2008) (arguing that “courts should aim to gain greater clarity about disputants’ preferences, and work to
deliberately implement those preferences”). Cf. Valerie Jenness & Kitty Calavita, “It Depends on the
Outcome”: Prisoners, Grievances, and Perceptions of Justice, 52 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41 (2018) (finding
that men incarcerated in California prisons focus substantially on the outcome of disputes as their
measure of justice).
196
See, e.g., Scott Cacciola, Victims in Larry Nassar Abuse Case Find a Fierce Advocate: The
Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/sports/larry-nassar-rosemarieaquilina-judge.html (discussing how trial judge allowed victims of Dr. Larry Nassar to tell their story in
open court).
197
Aeschylus famously described these events in his three-part play, Oresteia, which one author
has called “the oldest known courtroom drama in history.” SADAKAT KADRI, THE TRIAL: A HISTORY,
FROM SOCRATES TO O.J. SIMPSON 4 (2005). These mythical events are also discussed by Homer in The
Odyssey, and by Euripides in his play, Orestes. See, e.g., 1 ROBERT J. BONNER & GERTRUDE SMITH, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FROM HOMER TO ARISTOTLE 125–29 (AMS Press 1970) (1930). For an
excellent discussion of how justice is described in several Greek trials, see David Luban, Some Greek
Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus and Plato, 54 TENN. L. REV. 279 (1987).
198
BONNER & SMITH, supra note 197, at 125–29; KADRI, supra note 197, at 4–5.
199
Luban, supra note 197, at 295–96.
200
Id. at 297 (explaining that Athena thought the public trial was necessary to appease the Furies
and thereby protect the city).
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For another illustration, we can look to medieval Europe, where it was
fairly common to put animals and insects on trial for a variety of alleged
misdeeds—including eating human crops, harming or killing humans, or
having sexual relations with humans.201 One of the most famous of such
trials involved felony charges brought against the rats of Autun, France, in
1522.202 In that case, as in others, an attorney was appointed to represent the
animals.203 Along similar lines, the Athenians even held trials for inanimate
objects, such as stones or pieces of metal that caused harm to humans.204
Clearly the purpose of such trials was neither to find the truth nor to deter
animals, insects, or inanimate objects from misbehaving in the future.
Rather, while the trials did reach real conclusions (such as killing the
animals, dropping charges, or working out a settlement),205 presumably the
purpose of these trials had more to do with their educational or emotional
impact on human observers.206 More recently, we might consider the trial of
sexual abuser Dr. Larry Nassar, from Michigan State, in which the judge
allowed victims to directly confront their abuser.207 Again the point of the
interaction was not mere truth-finding.
Some other trials have served a more propagandist, educational, or
communal purpose. At various points in history, throughout the world,
powerful leaders have used “trials” to cement their victory over those they
have vanquished. Whether one thinks of the trial of Louis XVI during the
French Revolution,208 the Moscow “Show Trials,”209 or even the Nuremberg
Trials, one can see that the pomp and circumstance of a trial is sometimes
used for purposes different than ascertaining the truth. The Nuremberg trials
of Nazi officers at the end of World War II were not primarily designed to
201
KADRI, supra note 197, at 146–58. See E.P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS 1–17 (3d prtg. 2000) (explaining multiple purposes of trying animals and
insects including expurgation of evil spirits and protecting the community from future harms).
202
William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was it Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1889, 1898 (1995) (discussing charges brought against rats for “having eaten and wantonly
destroyed some barley crops in the jurisdiction”).
203
Attorney Barthelmy Chassenée argued his rat clients had not been provided with due notice of
the proceedings and did not have adequate opportunity to make their appearance, due to plaintiffs’ cats.
Id. at 1898–99. Other cases involving attacks by beetles or weevils on crops resulted in settlements, such
as the setting aside of plots of land for the use of the insects. KADRI, supra note 197, at 146.
204
Ewald, supra note 202, at 1912.
205
See, e.g., id. at 1903–04 (quoting Shakespeare’s mention in The Merchant of Venice of a wolf
“hanged for human slaughter” and also taking note of cows and pigs condemned to death).
206
See id. at 1905 (“[W]hat needs to be explained is not why one would put down a dangerous cow,
but why one would first bring the matter to the Law Faculty of Leipzig.”).
207
Sophie Gilbert, The Transformative Justice of Judge Aquilina, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/01/judge-rosemarie-aquilina-larrynassar/551462/. Cf. Kelly Hayes & Mariame Kaba, The Sentencing of Larry Nassar Was Not
‘Transformative Justice.’ Here’s Why, APPEAL (Feb. 5, 2018), https://theappeal.org/the-sentencing-oflarry-nassar-was-not-transformative-justice-here-s-why-a2ea323a6645/.
208
DAVID P. JORDAN, THE KING’S TRIAL: LOUIS XVI VS. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 44–45 (2004).
209
KADRI, supra note 197, at 178 (discussing Moscow Show Trials).
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find out what the officers had done, but rather to provide a venue in which
the responsibility of the perpetrators of injustice could be explored, and
through which the public could be educated.210 And, at the same time, these
goals caused some to worry that the Nuremberg trials “might set an example
of high politics masquerading as law.”211
Whether high-minded or cynical, bringing together the community to
discuss an important event may serve some purposes, including allowing
community members to express their desires for vengeance or other
emotions, to bond with other community members, to learn more about
events that have transpired, to consider whether forgiveness might be
possible, or to become educated as to potential next steps. Such hearings can
also lead people to believe that the world has been put back into balance by
punishing morally culpable animals, insects, or inanimate objects. While we
no longer hold trials for animals or inanimate objects, it seems that some of
these purposes remain part of our system of justice.
iv.

Other Goals and Costs

In addition to truth, appropriate remedies, procedural justice, and
education, other goals and costs have been and should be considered relevant
to justice. As Professor Alan Dershowitz has explained: “Our system of
justice . . . reflects a balance among often inconsistent goals, which include
truth, privacy, fairness, finality, and quality.”212 Many years ago, political
philosopher Jeremy Bentham expressed a similar thought, stating that while
it is desirable to uncover truth, one also has to consider the costs of doing
so—whether in terms of money, time, privacy, fairness, or vexation.213 Thus,
in our country and others, we sometimes design procedural rules and
investigatory practices to protect privacy, limit evidence,214 or exclude
results of improper searches. That is, aspects of our practices and procedures
210

See Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg Trials, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 488, 498 (1955) (noting how
Justice Jackson saw the Nuremberg Trials as an “unsettled period” that would “direct the world’s thought
toward a firmer enforcement of the laws of international conduct” (internal citation omitted)).
211
Charles E. Wyzanski, Nuremberg: A Fair Trial? A Dangerous Precedent, ATLANTIC (April
1946),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1946/04/nuremberg-a-fair-trial-a-dangerousprecedent/306492/.
212
ALAN DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS 42 (1996). See also SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note
146, at 209 (noting that goals of trials include “promoting public acceptance of verdicts, expressing
society’s values, asserting the authoritative power of the state, bringing closure to victims, and finalizing
disputes”); Freedman, supra note 13, at 1063 (urging that while a trial is, in part, a search for truth, it
also serves many other purposes, including protecting the parties’ dignity interests and constitutional
rights).
213
John D. Jackson, Theories of Truth Finding in Criminal Procedure: An Evolutionary Approach,
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 483 (1988) (citing 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, A RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE
bk. 10, ch. 10, at 736–47 (photo. reprt. 1978) (1827)).
214
See, e.g., PIZZI, supra note 143, at 48 (noting that “in the United States we have very tight rules
of evidence”).
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are geared to serve interests in fairness and justice and not merely lead to the
discovery of the truth.215
In sum, trials, both currently and historically, have been designed to do
far more than uncover the truth. Despite what we often say, truth is not and
has never been our exclusive goal nor certainly a guaranteed result of trials.
We must keep these additional ideas in mind as we think about how best to
design a system of justice to accommodate our new technology.
2. Non-Adjudicatory Processes
Trials are not the only means by which societies seek justice in civil and
criminal matters. Whether one looks cross-culturally, historically, or at
current practices in the United States, one will see that other
non-adjudicatory216 mechanisms, including negotiation, mediation,
community conferencing, and variants thereof, have been and are being used
to resolve disputes.217
Historically and cross-culturally, many societies’ systems of justice
have placed far greater emphasis on harmony and healing than on
adjudicatory individualistic approaches.218 In ancient Greece, philosopher
Plato emphasized that justice consisted of a harmony—all elements of the
society working well together.219 Similarly, many African, Pacific Island,
215
See, e.g., Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions, supra note 135, at 917 (“Appeals instead focus
almost entirely on process questions—was the trial conducted in accordance with the rules?—rather than
truth questions.”); Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143, 204
(2011) (“Notwithstanding occasional pronouncements of the importance of finding the truth, that goal is
effectively eclipsed by the prescribed procedural regime.”). See generally Herbert L. Packer, Two Models
of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964) (juxtaposing a Due Process model and a Crime
Control model of criminal justice).
216
While some distinguish “adversarial” and “non-adversarial” processes, I prefer to distinguish
“adjudicatory” and “non-adjudicatory” processes. By “adjudicatory” I mean those processes (trials and
arbitration) that seek to find a single truth. Negotiations and mediations, by contrast, may resolve disputes
without purporting to find a single truth. Disputants may be adverse and even hostile to one another in
both kinds of processes. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An
Argument That the Term “ADR” Has Begun to Outlive its Usefulness, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 97.
217
For general background on non-adjudicatory processes, see generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES (6th ed. 2012) (describing
the field of conflict resolution); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2018) (detailing different types of non-adjudicatory processes).
218
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What is it and Does it Work? 10.2
(Georgetown Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 1005485, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005485 (“Restorative justice is the name given to a variety of different
practices, including apologies, restitution, and acknowledgments of harm and injury, as well as to other
efforts to provide healing and reintegration of offenders into their communities, with or without
additional punishment.”); see also KEVIN AVRUCH, CULTURE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 12–15, 23–
26 (1998) (describing conflict resolution values throughout different societies).
219
See, e.g., Plato, The Republic Book IV, in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 271, 283 (W.H.D. Rouse
trans., 1961). See also STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 3–4 (2000) (stating that according to
Plato, “justice consists in a harmony of the parts or elements, a harmony imposed by reason”); Andrew
W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1665 (1985) (“Justice is
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Native American, and other societies have focused on bringing the society
or tribe back into balance, or on achieving harmony or reconciliation among
members of the society.220 For example, Native Hawaiians used a process
called “ho’oponopono,” which is drawn from the concept of disentangling
fishing lines;221 and Navajo Indians traditionally used a community
conferencing process geared to heal and restore the society.222 As well, even
within the United States, smaller and sub-communities have used restorative
and healing approaches throughout our history.223
Examples of non-adjudicatory approaches to dispute resolution also
exist within our current United States system of justice. Notably, though
many conceive of our system as trial-based, the vast majority of criminal
and civil matters are resolved through negotiation rather than through trials.
On the criminal side, the Supreme Court has stated that between ninety-four
and ninety-seven percent of cases are resolved through plea bargains,224 and
most filed civil matters are also settled.225 Many court programs now include
mandatory mediation and settlement conferences before permitting a matter

what we discover—you and I, Socrates said—when we walk together, listen together, and even love one
another, in our curiosity about what justice is and where justice comes from.”).
220
See, e.g., CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (Kevin Avruch et al. eds.,
1991) (cataloging different approaches to conflict resolution throughout cultures); Laura Nader, Styles of
Court Procedure: To Make the Balance, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 69, 69–92 (Laura Nader ed.,
1969) (describing the balancing dispute resolution approach taken by Mexican Zapotec Indians); 2 THE
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 15–79 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (presenting discussion of various
countries’ reliance on informal justice).
221
See, e.g., James A. Wall, Jr. & Ronda Roberts Callister, Ho’oponopono: Some Lessons from
Hawaiian Mediation, 11 NEGOT. J. 45, 47 (1995) (explaining that traditional Hawaiian process aims to
put things right, both spiritually and interpersonally, and ideally achieve mutual forgiveness).
222
See, e.g., Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175,
177–87 (1994) (contrasting the Western “vertical” system of justice, which relies on hierarchy and power
to resolve disputes, to the Navajo “horizontal” system, in which no authority has to determine what is
true and the goal is healing and restoration rather than determining right and wrong).
223
See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983) (considering nonadversarial approaches used by various American communities over the last several hundred years); THE
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 220, at 18–21 (describing the American experience with
informal justice).
224
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012). The Court explicitly recognized that “ours ‘is for
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.’” Id. (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376,
1388 (2012)). See generally ALKON & SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME, supra note 187.
225
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004) (tracking the decline of civil
trials in America).
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to be heard in court. More generally, restorative and transformative228
approaches are being used in courts and public policy settings throughout
the world.
While the differences among and between these processes are many, we
focus here on the approach of non-adjudicatory processes to truth-finding.
In short, truth-finding is not the focus of these processes. By contrast to
trials, which typically look backwards to determine the truth of what
happened and determine a consequent punishment or remedy,
non-adjudicatory processes typically look forward. Disputants in
non-adjudicatory processes may certainly care about their perceptions of
what happened in the past, but civil disputes of all kinds are often resolved
with settlement agreements that specifically disclaim findings of fault or
responsibility.229 Similarly, although criminal defendants must often plead
guilty to a crime to obtain their reduced sentence,230 these pleas are done
with at least a bit of a wink, so that few assume that a plea agreement is
really a factual determination.231 As advocates of non-adjudicatory
processes have explained, this forward-looking orientation allows disputants
to agree on future conduct without getting bogged down in the past.232 The
226

227

See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Beyond “Managerial Judges”: Appropriate Roles in Settlement, 78
OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 91 (2017) (stating that by the 1990s, mediation had become the most common form of
ADR offered by federal courts); Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep
on Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 412
(2005) (establishing that many surveyed judges believe that mandatory mediation “may actually threaten
litigants’ rights to substantive justice”).
227
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice, supra note 218, at 10.2 (“In its most
idealized form, there are four Rs of restorative justice: repair, restore, reconcile, and reintegrate the
offenders and victims to each other and to their shared community.”).
228
M. Kay Harris, Transformative Justice: The Transformation of Restorative Justice, in
HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 555, 555 (Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft
eds., 2006).
229
Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About Settlement in an
Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 664–65 (2001).
230
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and similar state rules, in theory require judges to
make a factual determination that evidence supports guilt before accepting a guilty plea. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(b)(3). However, in some jurisdictions, “a prison sentence [may Constitutionally be imposed]
upon an accused who is unwilling expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives, is
willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36 (1970).
231
It is well recognized by experts that innocent defendants may plead guilty “due to the overall
coercive atmosphere of plea bargaining.” Cynthia Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: When
Do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17 NEV. L.J. 401, 414 (2017). See also SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note
146, at 210 (explaining that the public admission made in a plea bargain does not guarantee the accuracy
of the plea, as plea bargains are driven primarily by tactical considerations).
232
See, e.g., JAMES J. ALFINI, SHARON B. PRESS & JOSEPH B. STULBERG, MEDIATION THEORY AND
PRACTICE 125 (3d ed. 2013) (suggesting that mediators “remind parties that they cannot change what
happened in the past, but they can decide how they want things to be in the future”); Carrie J. MenkelMeadow, Remembrance of Things Past? The Relationship of Past to Future in Pursuing Justice in
Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 97, 98 (2004) (observing that one of mediation’s “defining
characteristics” is that “mediation is not required to deal with the past; it asks the parties to look to their
futures and remake their duties and responsibilities toward each other”).
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divorcing parents need not reach an agreement over who had what affairs or
who wasted how much money to reach a settlement on child custody, child
support, and other matters. The employee and employer need not come to a
common understanding as to whether sexual harassment occurred for them
to amicably part ways and agree on a severance package. The company can
pay an injured person without conceding liability.
Moreover, to the extent that non-adjudicatory processes do focus on the
past, third-party neutrals and others involved in these processes tend to
recognize that one’s view of truth depends on one’s perspective.233 For
example, when disputants in a mediation make claims to truth, mediators
may well encourage them to appreciate that while they have their opinion,
others may see the world differently.234 For this reason, dispute resolution
scholar Carrie Menkel-Meadow explains that negotiation and mediation can
be seen as postmodernist, in that they can “permit[] several realities to ‘coexist’” and “enable relevant parties to ‘mediate’ their own stories and
realities of the past.”235 She further states:
I suggest the heretical notion that the adversary system may no
longer be the best method for our legal system to deal with all
of the matters that come within its purview. If late-twentieth
century learning has taught us anything, it is that truth is
illusive, partial, interpretable, dependent on the characteristics
of the knowers as well as the known, and, most importantly,
complex. . . . The binary nature of the adversary system and
its particular methods and tactics often may thwart some of the
essential goals of any legal system.236
A second important way that non-adjudicatory processes differ from
adjudicatory processes in their approach to justice is that they may view
problems and disputes more broadly. Rather than focus primarily on legal
rights and remedies, processes such as negotiation and mediation often look

233

See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System, supra note 147, at 5–6
(critiquing “[t]he binary nature of the adversarial system”).
234
David A. Hoffman & Richard N. Wolman, The Psychology of Mediation, 14 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 759, 765, 769–70, 801 (2013) (discussing how mediators can help disputants
appreciate that they are interpreting the same events in different ways). Cf. James R. Coben, Barnacles,
Aristocracy and Truth Denial: Three Not So Beautiful Aspects of Contemporary Mediation, 16 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 779, 781–82, 800–05 (2014) (expressing discomfort with the post-modernist views
of mediation).
235
Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past?, supra note 232, at 104.
236
Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System, supra note 147, at 5–6 (arguing that
the adversary system is an “inadequate” and even “dangerous” method for satisfying important dispute
resolution goals, and that “[b]inary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute are not the best way for
us to learn the truth”).
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at disputants’ interests, problems, and goals.
This broadening can
potentially help individuals and communities heal their rifts.238 Thus, in the
criminal context, a broader approach might consider a defendant’s
education, mental and physical health, and employment options.239
Examination of such factors might lead a justice system to emphasize
reparations, apologies, or education over incarceration. Civilly, the broader
approach might look at whether disputants wish to have a future personal or
business relationship, whether disputants have non-monetary interests that
might be used to forge a future agreement, or whether an apology might be
meaningful to the disputants. When such factors are considered, sometimes
disputant businesses or individuals can craft creative agreements that serve
their interests more effectively than a court might decree.240
III. HOW OUR NEW TECHNOLOGY CAN HELP US THINK MORE CLEARLY
ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD SEEK IN A SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
With these broader goals in mind, we now return to the original
question: how should we integrate our powerful new technology into our
system of justice? We have seen that this technology may help us get to some
truth, but that due to technical limits and our human psyches, we cannot
realistically expect any technology to bring us truthful answers to all of our
questions. We have also seen that while truth is relevant to justice, justice is
far bigger than truth. How, then, should we design our justice system to best
take account of the truth-finding capabilities of our new technology while
237

See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 14, 17–18 (1996) (explaining that
mediators can encourage parties to approach disputes from either a broad or narrow perspective, and that
mediators can also help disputants work towards resolution by either offering evaluations or instead
merely facilitating disputants’ own discussions and insights).
238
See, e.g., Lela P. Love, Images of Justice, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 29, 29–32 (2000)
(describing, in artistic terms, the core distinctions between images of litigation, mediation, and
arbitration); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human Problem
Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 7, 18 (2004)
(“Legal problem solving is not just about adversarial argument or persuasion about what is ‘right’ for the
client; it is about understanding a range of possible goals for clients and those with whom they interact,
and seeking both substantive outcomes and appropriate processes to satisfy the needs and interests of
clients and those engaged in activity with the client.”).
239
This broader approach is the premise of today’s “problem-solving courts.” See PAMELA M.
CASEY & DAVID B. ROTTMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: MODELS
AND TRENDS 1 (2003), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Publications/Justice%20System%20
Journal/PROBLEM-SOLVING_COURTS_Models_and_Trends.ashx (providing an overview of
problem-solving courts developed “in response to frustration by both the court system and the public to
the large numbers of cases that seemed to be disposed repeatedly but not resolved”).
240
Some of the classic U.S. dispute resolution literature espousing this approach includes ROGER
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce
Patton ed., 3d ed. 2011) and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
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also serving our greater interests in justice? While I do not purport to have
all the answers, I am certain it is critically important to systematically
anticipate how best to incorporate our new technology into our systems of
dispute resolution.241 As one commentator put it: “[T]he accelerating
technological tsunami is a Pandora’s box likely to eclipse all other influences
on human interaction, for good and for ill.”242 Thus, I see this Article as the
beginning of an extremely important brainstorming session.243
As we engage in this mental exercise, I propose two preliminary ideas.
First, I do not think we should aim to devise a single form of dispute
resolution, but rather suggest that we should look for multiple processes that,
together, can comprise a just system of dispute resolution. Like others in my
field, I believe in “process pluralism,” the idea that no single process is best
for all circumstances.244 Multiple processes are likely also essential to take
account of the fact that we have no single conception of justice. Second, I
urge that we allow ourselves to think broadly and creatively about our
systems of justice, without worrying about current legal rules and limits. I
realize, of course, that the U.S. Constitution sets significant constraints for
how our dispute resolution systems might be redesigned. The Sixth and
Seventh Amendments, for example, require that a jury trial be afforded in
many criminal and civil cases.245 Yet, while I have sometimes fiercely
defended the right to a civil jury trial,246 I suggest we try to think about how
our new technology should impact our dispute resolution systems from
purely a policy perspective, and leave to another day the question of what is
possible under our existing Constitution. In theory, at least, we might want
to amend the Constitution. Conceivably, a form of dispute resolution that
made sense hundreds of years ago, when disputes were resolved based on
personal observations and live witness testimony, will no longer be the most

241

Many years ago, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger used the term “systematic anticipation” to
encourage us to rethink how best to design our justice system. See generally Warren E. Burger, Agenda
for 2000 A.D.–Need for Systematic Anticipation, 15 JUDGES’ J. 27 (1976) (providing the keynote address
at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
also known as the “Pound Conference”).
242
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Living the Dream of ADR: Reflections on Four Decades of the Quiet
Revolution in Dispute Resolution, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 513, 514 (2017).
243
While brainstorming is generally thought of as a group activity, recent psychological research
shows that creativity is enhanced when group members first search for solutions individually, lest their
ideas be squelched by group behaviors. See, e.g., Art Markman, Your Team is Brainstorming All Wrong,
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 18, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/05/your-team-is-brainstorming-all-wrong
(discussing brainstorming techniques that “allow individual work during divergent phases of creativity
and group work during convergent phases”).
244
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of
Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 554–55 (2006) (explaining “process pluralism”).
245
U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
246
See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 669, 669–733 (2001) (discussing jury trial
rights under the Seventh Amendment).
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appropriate means to resolve disputes in our brave new era of sophisticated
technology.
Moving on from these preliminaries, I further suggest that we consider
three primary issues as we ponder what forms of dispute resolution will best
serve justice in our new era of technology-assisted dispute resolution: (1)
what forms of dispute resolution may help us resolve technical issues that
will inevitably arise; (2) what forms of dispute resolution may help us deal
with human psychology that causes people to react differently than one
another to given technological data; and (3) what forms of dispute resolution
will help us think more clearly about issues other than truth—that is how
best to handle situations once we know the truth of what happened.
A. Resolving Technical Issues
As our evidence becomes increasingly scientific, we need to devise
ways to better integrate competent technical analysis into our dispute
resolution. In part, this requires us to look again at an issue that we have
been considering for over a hundred years: do judges and juries have
sufficient ability to understand and evaluate scientific evidence, and if not,
what reforms should be made?247 Jurors’ forte was once their knowledge of
the community.248 We later relied on jurors’ supposed common sense and
purported ability to determine witness veracity.249 Judges are trained in
interpreting the law. But neither judges nor jurors typically have scientific
training that will help them resolve such questions as whether the DNA
matches, whether the geo-location data is reliable, or whether a video has
been faked.250 Nor am I convinced that an inquisitorial system is inherently

247
See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Learned Hand,
J.) (“How long we shall continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative
scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one knows; but all fair persons not
conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I should think, unite to effect some such
advance.”); see also Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE
L.J. 1535, 1539 (1998) (arguing that because judges and juries generally lack “epistemic” competence
their decisions often fail to provide “intellectual due process”); Learned Hand, Historical and Practical
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1901) (“No one will deny that
the law should in some way effectively use expert knowledge wherever it will aid in settling disputes.
The only question is as to how it can do so best.”). See generally TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS
OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 6 (2007)
(discussing the difficulties in early adaptations of experts in the adversarial environment).
248
See OLDHAM, supra note 15, at 2–3 (describing how, in the “early era of the jury in England,”
“the jurors came from the neighborhood, and some of them, at least, were expected to know or to find
out the facts of the dispute in litigation”).
249
See, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 169 (1989) (drawing on psychology to critique jurors’ supposed common
sensibility to evaluate witness credibility).
250
While some may assume that judges would at least be more scientifically competent than jurors,
this is not necessarily so. See Brewer, supra note 247, at 1677–78.
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better suited to resolve technical issues than is an adversarial process.251 The
fundamental problem, as Professor Scott Brewer explained twenty years
ago, is that it is increasingly unlikely that “one and the same decisionmaker
has both legal legitimacy . . . and epistemic competence with the basic
formal tools of scientific analysis.”252 As we become increasingly focused
on technology and as this technology advances and covers a broad array of
fields, it will be increasingly difficult or more likely impossible to find
individuals who possess both sets of expertise.253 Realistically, not even the
same scientist—much less the same scientist/judge—would have the
expertise to assess DNA, brain scans, and video evidence.254
To date in the United States, we have primarily relied on dueling expert
witnesses to help judges and juries evaluate technical evidence.255 While we
can tell ourselves that this works, and it does to some degree, many have
questioned whether this is the best means to evaluate scientific evidence.256
First, even with the help of experts, untrained judges and juries may not be
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Cf. Sevier, A [Relational] Theory of Procedure, supra note 14, at 5–6.
Brewer, supra note 247, at 1677 (suggesting four possible ways of achieving a “two-hat
solution”: (1) sending decisions currently made in private litigation to public agencies staffed by
scientists; (2) using “blue ribbon scientifically trained juries”; (3) relying on “scientific expert magistrate
judges”; or (4) sending certain matters to “science courts staffed by scientifically trained judges”).
253
See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 498 (2005) (discussing the “vanishingly small
effect” Daubert standards have on the removal rate); Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert
on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 339, 339 (2002) (“Scientific and technical advances are being made daily; therefore, keeping up to
date on all, or even most, of these advancements is nearly impossible.”).
254
Proposals have, however, been made that might at least aid judicial and juror comprehension of
scientific evidence. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL’Y
19, 40–41 (2007) (describing “the use of juror note-taking, the use of jury notebooks in appropriate cases,
the careful consideration of using juror questions, and the option of allowing jurors to discuss evidence
as the case proceeds rather than waiting for the final deliberations”); N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks,
Jurors and Scientific Causation: What Don’t They Know, and What Can Be Done About It?, 52
JURIMETRICS 433, 433 (2012) (training jurors to be better “consumers” of evidence through an
“educational intervention”). See also Melissa Whitney, How to Improve Technical Expertise for Judges
in AI-related Litigation, BROOKINGS (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-toimprove-technical-expertise-for-judges-in-ai-related-litigation/ (summarizing Brookings Institution
report on improving judges’ technical expertise).
255
For an examination of how judges apply current case law regarding the admissibility of scientific
evidence, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY (2018).
256
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2008) (observing that “a century’s worth of writing about expert evidence
circles around the same themes and consistently reaches the same conclusion: that the use of
party-selected expert witnesses in an adversarial legal system is fraught with difficulties”). See also Lora
M. Levett & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effectiveness of Opposing Expert Witnesses for Educating Jurors
About Unreliable Expert Evidence, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 363, 372 (2008) (finding adversarial model
does not effectively educate jurors about strengths and weaknesses of expert testimony, instead tending
to make jurors skeptical about all expert testimony).
252
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able to make good technical determinations. In a battle of experts, judge
or jury may be swayed by charisma or fall prey to the mistakes of a
well-meaning expert.258 Second, wealthier parties will be advantaged in
hiring technical experts.259 In the criminal setting, this disparity will often
favor the prosecution, as indigent, poor, or even middle class defendants
often will not be able to hire experts to challenge the prosecution’s
evidence.260 In civil cases, a richer party could even potentially manufacture
evidence and use it to win a claim against a poorer party, potentially unable
to hire the experts necessary to defeat a claim for theft, fraud, or breach of
contract. The difficulty in evaluating technical evidence will also impact
non-adjudicatory forms of dispute resolution. In the future, we will be
negotiating and mediating in the shadow of technical evidence, as well as
trial. While the fact that our justice system is impacted by wealth inequalities
is not new, these disparities will be significantly heightened with the
increasing importance of technical evidence.
As we become more highly dependent on scientific and technical
information, it may be appropriate to ask a non-partisan scientific entity to
evaluate such information.261 Specifically, we might consider having a panel
of neutral highly credentialed scientific experts, paid for by tax dollars,
charged with examining certain kinds of scientific evidence pertaining to
claims brought in a particular jurisdiction.262 These sorts of panels have
257

Many empirical studies examine the competence of both judges and juries to make scientific and
technical determinations. The results are mixed, generally showing that judges and juries are neither
entirely competent nor entirely incompetent. See, e.g., Hans, supra note 254, at 21 (stating that while
there are difficulties, most research indicates that juries do reasonably well in understanding complex
evidence); Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
1121, 1146, 1180 (2001) (discussing how jurors’ use of evidence and response to various forms of expert
evidence differs in each case).
258
See, e.g., James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 266–67
(2018) (stating that “[d]ecision makers who lack the ability to engage with the substance of an expert
disagreement must fall back on heuristic shortcuts,” such as the demeanor and credentials of the testifying
expert).
259
See David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 281, 281 (1990) (discussing that “[t]he ability to obtain an expert witness can be a
decisive factor in civil litigation,” meaning indigent civil litigants are at a disadvantage).
260
See Findley, Innocents at Risk, supra note 135, at 898–902 (describing the accused’s
“disadvantage by lack of access to crime scene evidence and investigative resources”). Occasionally this
economic disparity will favor a wealthy criminal defendant, such as O.J. Simpson, who was able to hire
a “dream team” of attorneys to dispute the government’s double murder case against him. It is estimated
that O.J.’s “dream team” cost him $50,000 a day. Jason Guerrasio, How O.J. Simpson Paid for the
‘Dream Team’ of Lawyers on His Murder Trial, BUS. INSIDER (June 19, 2016, 2:27 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-oj-simpson-paid-for-the-dream-team-2016-6.
261
For a discussion of the use of expert panels in the administrative law context, see Adrian
Vermeule, The Parliament of the Experts, 58 DUKE L.J. 2231 (2009).
262
See Dillon, supra note 258, at 252 (suggesting creation of “an administrative office staffed by
individuals with expertise in a range of scientific domains that most commonly arise in litigation” who
might be granted authority to decide legal questions requiring scientific judgment). Cf. Nancy J. Brekke
et al., Of Juries and Court-Appointed Experts: The Impact of Nonadversarial Versus Adversarial Expert
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already been considered in other contexts, such as mass torts. There could
be many versions of such an idea, with variations as to how many panel
members should be consulted and the kinds of issues panel members should
consider. Such an expert panel might for example make general
determinations that certain tests (such as polygraphs) could never or might
sometimes be relied upon in a legal setting.264 In specific cases, such a panel
might also opine on whether a particular technical finding based on DNA,
fingerprint analysis, or video was sufficiently reliable in that instance. With
respect to the interaction between panel and legal expertise, such panel
determinations might be either evidence to be considered by a judge or jury,
or perhaps even final rulings in some situations.
The idea of having scientific issues resolved by a governmental panel
has its roots in prior proposals that would appoint a single non-partisan
expert to assist jurors and judges in their deliberations.265 The Federal Rules
of Evidence already permit judges to appoint such experts, and they
sometimes do so.266 Along similar lines, judges sometimes appoint special
masters who have scientific training to help resolve technical evidentiary or
similar issues.267 However, the panel I am suggesting would potentially go
further than these proposals, perhaps finally resolving certain technical
issues rather than merely offering testimony to a jury, judge, or other
decisionmaker.
Admittedly, the idea of government panels is not a perfect solution and,
as noted, many details regarding cost, neutrality, probabilistic parameters,
and jurisdiction would need to be worked out.268 Yet, while the problems
with the proposal are evident, the growing importance of technical evidence
will force us to consider this or similar options. It will be increasingly

Testimony, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 451, 451 (1991) (finding that jurors pay more attention to battling
adversarial experts than to a single court-appointed expert).
263
See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Would a Federal Judicial Science Board Improve Toxic Tort
Litigation?, 17 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 761, 762 (1990) (considering the benefit of installing a Federal
Judicial Science Board to deal with experts in toxic tort litigation).
264
Such a panel might essentially be charged with making the “reliability” portion of the
determination required by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 592–95 (1993). See also FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing in part that expert testimony must be “the
product of reliable principles and methods”).
265
See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REV. 40, 56 (1901) (suggesting a new way to present expert testimony). See also Jennifer L.
Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An Intellectual History of Expert Evidence, 52
VILL. L. REV. 763 (2007) (analyzing the role and reliability of experts).
266
FED. R. EVID. 706. For a discussion of the creation of a special panel of experts to consider
scientific claims pertaining to silicone breast implants, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A CONVERGENCE
OF SCIENCE AND LAW: A SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
AND LAW PANEL 5–8 (2001).
267
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 266, at 7; Hans, supra note 254, at 20.
268
For other issues to be resolved, see supra text accompanying note 261–267.
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infeasible and unfair to simply rely on lay persons, whether jurors or judges,
to decide complex scientific issues, even with the help of expert witnesses.
At the same time, while determining the technical validity of potential
evidence will be tough, this is only one of several problems to be
considered—and is really the easiest one. We now turn our attention to the
harder issues.
B. Dealing with Multiple Interpretations
Even assuming that our new technology provides information that is
genuine and accurate, we know that interpretive issues will often remain.269
We have seen that technology does not speak for itself but rather is
interpreted by human investigators, attorneys, disputants, jurors, and judges,
based on their prior experiences and knowledge.270 While we each typically
believe that our own interpretation is obvious and right, research shows that
others may interpret the same evidence quite differently and be equally sure
they are right.
One of our existing forms of dispute resolution, the jury trial, might
seem ideal to handle the fact that the same evidence may be viewed and
interpreted differently by different people.271 While juries may not be
particularly adept at analyzing technical evidence, it is frequently assumed
they would be fairly well suited to providing diverse interpretations on
videos, pictures, or other pieces of technical evidence. Juries are at least
supposed to provide diversity from the community.272 It seems logical that a
group of twelve or even six community members,273 required to deliberate
with one another,274 might help each other see that their individual

269

Note that there may be an interaction between scientific incompetence and psychological
preconceptions or biases. See Dillon, supra note 258, at 266–67 (“Decision makers who lack the ability
to engage with the substance of an expert disagreement must fall back on heuristic shortcuts to reach a
decision; in so doing, they open the door for implicit (or at times explicit) biases to affect the process.”).
270
See supra text accompanying note 163.
271
See Francis X. Flanagan, Race, Gender, and Juries: Evidence from North Carolina, 61 J.L. &
ECON. 189, 212 (2018) (concluding that the race and gender composition of the jury pool significantly
impacts the likelihood of conviction).
272
Francis X. Flanagan, Peremptory Challenges and Jury Selection, 58 J.L. & ECON. 385, 395
(2015) (finding that lawyers’ exercise of peremptory challenges tends to make juries more homogenous).
See Hans Zeisel & Shari S. Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An
Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 531 (1978) (concluding that voir dire
process leads to different results in some cases).
273
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) (finding the use of six-person juries in criminal
cases to be constitutionally permissible).
274
See generally DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 152–80
(2012) (collecting social science on the impact of deliberation in contrast to allowing jurors to reach
independent conclusions); SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 146, at 197–202 (discussing the effects of jury
deliberation).
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interpretations are subject to challenge. Jury researchers Neil Vidmar and
Valerie Hans state: “The idea of a representative jury is a compelling one. A
jury of people with a wide range of backgrounds, life experiences, and world
knowledge will promote accurate fact-finding . . . .”276 Certainly the hope is
that as jurors deliberate, they will help one another get beyond their improper
biases and set aside incorrect information.277
In fact, however, psychological research is quite mixed on the extent to
which jury deliberation can cure or even ameliorate preconceptions and
biases.278 Dennis J. Devine, who has studied this issue for many years,
explains:
On one hand, deliberation could cause jurors to examine the
evidence more actively and critically, increasing the chance
that juries arrive at the “correct” decision in relation to their
constituent members. According to this view, the biases and
prejudices of individual members will tend to cancel out
during deliberation. On the other hand, deliberation could
potentially make matters worse, amplifying and propagating
the biases of their members.279
That is, while jurors with disparate perspectives can potentially help one
another see evidence through different lenses,280 aspects of individual
psychology and group decision making sometimes cause amplification
rather than diminution of individual biases as jurors try to convince one
another their views are correct.281 Devine and others conclude that the
275

DEVINE, supra note 274, at 179–80 (discussing many ways in which deliberation can impact
jury decision making); SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 146, at 198 (stating deliberative jury decisions are
not necessarily either better or worse than decisions made by individual jurors).
276
NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES 74 (2007).
277
DEVINE, supra note 274, at 179.
278
Id. This same ambiguity affects many different kinds of groups—from boards of directors to
community groups to law faculties. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND
GROUPTHINK TO MAKE GROUPS SMARTER 2 (2014) (“Do groups usually correct individual mistakes?
Our simple answer is that they do not. Far too often, groups actually amplify those mistakes. With respect
to the planning fallacy, for example, groups turn out to be even worse than individuals are—which is a
clue to a lot of failures in business, government, and daily life.”).
279
DEVINE, supra note 274, at 177–78. See also Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, The
Contemporary American Jury, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 239 (2018) (advocating more research into
the jury decision making process).
280
See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597,
597 (2006) (reporting that racially diverse juries exchanged more information than all-white juries and
were more amenable to discussions of racism). See also Anita Woolley & Thomas W. Malone, Defend
Your Research: What Makes a Team Smarter? More Women, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2011),
https://hbr.org/2011/06/defend-your-research-what-makes-a-team-smarter-more-women (discussing the
impact women have in groupthink).
281
See, e.g., Sara Gordon, All Together Now: Using Principles of Group Dynamics to Train Better
Jurors, 48 IND. L. REV. 415, 440–48 (2015) (reporting that group conformity, free riding, and social
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determinants of whether individual biases are diminished or enhanced are
factors such as the strength of the evidence and the distribution of
bias/preconception amongst the jurors.282 While it is conceivable that jurors
might be trained to get beyond some of the impediments to good
deliberation,283 this approach has not been empirically validated and could
be difficult to implement.284 In short, juries are no panacea in terms of
incorporating multiple perspectives. Perhaps we might come up with other
approaches that would do as well or better at securing community input that
might ameliorate inappropriate biases.
In the criminal law context, grand juries have historically provided an
opportunity for prosecutors to gain input from a broader segment of the
community before bringing charges.285 Pursuant to this practice, which is
used in federal courts for felonies and also in about half the states,286 a group
of roughly twenty citizens is asked to opine on whether probable cause exists
to bring charges against a particular person or entity.287 Admittedly, in our
current system, the grand jury seems to provide little check on prosecutors,
as it is often joked that a grand jury would even indict a ham sandwich if the
prosecutor asked it to do so.288 Yet, despite the practical limits to the existing
grand jury process, in theory, at least, a mechanism akin to the grand jury

loafing may undermine jurors’ willingness or ability to challenge others’ views); Christine L. Ruva &
Christina C. Guenther, Keep Your Bias to Yourself: How Deliberating With Differently Biased Others
Affects Mock-Jurors’ Guilt Decisions, Perceptions of the Defendant, Memories and Evidence
Interpretation, 41 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 478, 479 (2017) (explaining that group polarization may lead jurors
with different views to anchor into those views more deeply if confronted by another perspective).
282
See DEVINE, supra note 274, at 179 (noting that groups tend to be better at incorporating
members’ views in extreme cases, when evidence is generally very strong or very weak, but in more
moderate or ambiguous cases the deliberation process may exacerbate differences among jurors or
biases).
283
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 281, at 423–24 (advocating that juries be trained in group
dynamics).
284
That is, it would likely be time consuming and expensive.
285
See generally GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY (Roger Anthony
Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2010) (outlining historical practices of grand juries and arguing for new approaches to
help deter mass incarceration).
286
SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:2 (2018).
287
See Roger A. Fairfax Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of Unjustified Police Killings
– Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397, 401–03 (2017). See generally Niki Kuckes,
Retelling Grand Jury History, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 125
(Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2010) (disputing Supreme Court’s description of grand jury history).
288
Grand juries are presumably compliant because they only hear the prosecutor’s side of the case,
and not the potential defendant’s. Some have suggested we reform the current grand jury system by
appointing counsel who could provide independent guidance to the grand jury members. See Fairfax Jr.,
supra note 287, at 414, 417 (explaining “independent prosecutor” models). See also Ric Simmons, The
Role of the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury in Police Use of Deadly Force Cases: Restoring the Grand
Jury To Its Original Purpose, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 519, 520–23 (2017) (explaining that grand juries’
compliance is attributable in part to the Supreme Court decisions refusing to apply hearsay or other
evidentiary exclusions in the grand jury setting).
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could allow much needed community input to check a prosecutor’s
reading of scientific evidence.290 A true cross-section of the community
might offer an alternative interpretation of a photo or video, or even of
bacterial, DNA, or brainwave evidence. For this reason, while not focusing
on scientific evidence, multiple commentators have already suggested that
we place greater emphasis on the grand jury process in order to rein in
prosecutorial discretion.291 While grand jury members will no doubt have
their own predispositions and biases, prosecutors could at least learn that
their own perspectives are not universal.292 That is, community members
with different racial, ethnic, or political backgrounds, or simply persons who
are not members of a law enforcement community, might take a fresh look
at a video, pictures, fingerprints, brain scans, or similar evidence. Of course,
to avoid the ham sandwich problem we would need to reform current
practice to provide the grand jury with greater independence from the
prosecutor than currently exists.293 But the idea of having early independent
community review of technical evidence may be worth pursuing. Indeed,
perhaps there might be a way to solicit community input on technical
evidence such as videos or photos in civil as well as criminal cases.
In this modern age, there may also be other better ways than a traditional
jury or grand jury to gain insights that might lessen biases and
preconceptions affecting the interpretation of technical evidence.
Specifically, we might use the internet to ask persons from different classes,
races, genders, political parties, and so on to opine on the meaning of a
photo, video, or even DNA evidence.294 With the internet, we need not rely
289

As others have observed, the relevant “community” could be defined in multiple ways. See, e.g.,
Adriaan Lanni, Implementing the Neighborhood Grand Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN
PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 171, 172–73 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2010) (explaining the
“neighborhood grand jury” model wherein local community members play an active role in prosecutorial
charging decisions).
290
Of course, this might be a good idea for other evidence too.
291
See, e.g., Lanni, supra note 289, at 171 (explaining the prosecutor’s potentially overbroad
power); Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON
THE GRAND JURY 253–55 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2010) (criticizing the lack of attention grand
juries and their biases receive).
292
See Fairfax Jr., supra note 287, at 404 (explaining the basis for grand juror biases driving
decision making).
293
See id. at 416 (“Perhaps the most important factor related to the grand jury’s effectiveness . . . is
the real or perceived lack of independence of the prosecutor who is tasked with investigating and bringing
charges . . . .”).
294
See Samuel D. Gosling & Winter Mason, Internet Research in Psychology, 66 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 877, 878 (2015) (noting the ease with which various media can be incorporated into studies
done through the internet); see also Michael Buhrmester et al., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New
Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 3 (2011) (describing an
online platform employing a diverse workforce representing more than 100 countries); Scott Plous,
Online
Social
Psychology
Studies,
SOC.
PSYCHOL.
NETWORK,
https://www.socialpsychology.org/expts.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2019) (collecting web-based
experiments and surveys).
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on the purported randomness of jury selection and voir dire to hope that we
get a good cross-section of the community, but rather can even target
particular populations and solicit their views.295 Admittedly, no research tool
is perfect. Anyone who relies on the internet will for example want to
consider whether certain populations lack access to the internet, and whether
the anonymity of the internet may cause responders to be sloppy or even
prevaricate. However, those who have looked at these issues are generally
quite pleased with the internet’s potential as a research tool.296 This idea, of
drawing broadly on the perspective of the citizenry, resembles the concept
of the “citizens’ jury” that is sometimes being used in the United States and
around the world to solicit input on public policy issues.297
Logistically, how might these or other ideas be implemented to solicit
peoples’ disparate views on technological data? In the criminal context, it is
fairly easy to imagine that police or prosecutors might solicit alternative
interpretations of photos, videos, or other potential evidence, whether
through a version of grand juries or perhaps using the internet. While some
might suggest that prosecutors would never do this, because they only want
to interpret evidence in order to secure convictions, perhaps this is overly
cynical. First, it is well known and often stated that prosecutors’ duty is to
serve justice, not merely to obtain convictions.298 This is sometimes more
than baloney. Recently, a few prosecutors in major jurisdictions have
announced that they are seeking progressive reforms.299 Second, even those
prosecutors who are geared to obtain convictions whenever possible have an
interest in understanding how evidence will be interpreted by jurors or other
finders of fact. It does not serve such prosecutors’ interest to rely on
particular evidence to support a conviction if, in the end, many viewers will
see it as non-incriminating.
On the civil side, lawyers or disputants themselves may want to get an
early read on how their technical evidence might be viewed by a judge or
295

See, e.g., Gosling & Mason, supra note 294, at 890–91 (explaining the benefits and uses of
targeting populations for data collection through the internet).
296
See, e.g., id. at 892–93 (explaining the potential for misrepresentation based on certain classes’
lack of access to the internet or dishonesty of internet users).
297
See, e.g., Rob D. Fish et al., Employing the Citizens’ Jury Technique to Elicit Reasoned Public
Judgments About Environmental Risk: Insights from an Inquiry into the Governance of Microbial Water
Pollution, 57 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 233, 233 (2014) (explaining the role of a citizens’ jury in
providing public judgment about environmental policy issues).
298
See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 612–18 (1999) (outlining the historical and current concept of “the duty to seek justice”).
299
Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner is one example. Ben Austen, In Philadelphia, a
Progressive D.A. Tests the Power – and Learns the Limits – Of His Office, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 30,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/magazine/larry-krasner-philadelphia-district-attorneyprogressive.html. See also Rebecca McCray, Brooklyn District Attorney Candidates Spar for Title of
‘Most Progressive’, APPEAL (Aug. 31, 2017), https://theappeal.org/brooklyn-district-attorneycandidates-spar-for-title-of-most-progressive-fbd600efeae6/ (explaining the progressive platforms of
candidates for Brooklyn District Attorney).
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jury. To some degree, this is already done. Jury consultants provide a broad
range of services to attorneys, and sometimes may use the internet to predict
how an actual jury would react to the case. For example, a company called
DecisionQuest advertises that it uses “[t]he power of the internet” to let
attorneys see, at a fairly low cost, how a large and diverse pool of persons
might respond to particular arguments or evidence.300 While these
companies currently emphasize using surveys based on written fact patterns,
it is easy to imagine using them to have internet users opine on particular
photos, videos, or other forms of evidence.
Thinking more expansively, might it also be appropriate in this era to
require our system of justice to solicit a broader range of views in civil and
criminal cases? Why depend on, at most, twelve possibly diverse jurors to
opine on the meaning of scientific evidence? Further, even assuming
diversity among jurors, we have seen that the group decision making process
may deter some jurors from expressing their contrary views.301 Instead, we
could require those disputants who rely on various kinds of scientific
evidence to have it vetted by a large group of diverse persons to determine
how they view that information. Even if those views were not binding,
perhaps they would be relevant to the disputants or to the decisionmakers
and help them appreciate others’ perspectives?
While the ideas discussed in this Section are not spelled out in detail,
surely it is worth considering these kinds of options as a means to deal with
the biases that will be so important in interpreting our new technical
evidence?
C. Justice Beyond Truth
Ironically, the greatest contribution of our new technology to dispute
resolution may be that it helps us focus more on the non-truth aspects of
justice. To the extent that our new technology can help us answer basic
“what happened” questions,302 we will be able to pay more attention to other
aspects of justice. Given that X happened, why did it happen? What do we
want to do about it? Should we punish someone? If so, how? Should we seek
reparations or compensation? Ask for apologies? Educate our fellow
community members? Implement reforms to prevent such problems from
300

DECISIONQUEST, http://www.decisionquest.com/services/online-jury-research/ (last visited Jan.
25, 2019) (relying on online surveys); see also R&D ONLINE SERVICES, https://www.rdss.com/rd_services_online/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2019) (stating that it uses “the immediacy of the Internet”
to assess cases in a cost-effective manner). In addition, ejury.com uses the internet to solicit feedback
from members of the public in order to help attorneys try to settle their cases. See Bryan Edelman, Using
Online Surveys to Conduct Jury Research, JURY EXPERT (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2011/11/using-online-surveys-to-conduct-jury-research/ (explaining the
use of online surveys in jury research).
301
See supra text accompanying notes 275–81.
302
While the technology will not find all truths, it will provide some useful information that would
not otherwise have been available.
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occurring in the future? And, we can focus more on such structural issues as
how best to provide procedural justice, educate the community, enforce
community norms, ensure appropriate privacy, and resolve disputes
efficiently and effectively.
If we seek to focus more on the non-truth aspects of dispute resolution,
what form or forms of dispute resolution make most sense in our modern
world, where many of us have different perspectives on the appropriate goals
of a justice system, and where most members of the society likely have no
prior knowledge of the individuals who may have been involved in criminal
or civil disputes? Perhaps it is best to rely, as we do with trials, on a system
where a legislature passes laws based on beliefs held by at least a majority
of the society. These laws both lay out the rules of behavior and provide
many of the consequences when rules are broken, leaving fairly little
discretion in the hands of factfinders such as judges and juries. Or, once we
know who did what to whom, perhaps we should afford more discretion to
either individual disputants or communities. And maybe we can devise more
accessible processes, in which disputants can more fully tell their stories,
and thus feel as if they have received more procedural justice.
While our current trial-centric approach to justice may feel inevitable,
in fact it is not. There is no reason to see trials as the necessary endpoint in
the evolution of our dispute resolution systems.303 Trials, certainly, can be a
very good form of dispute resolution. In the pre-technology era, they were a
reasonably effective way of trying to determine the truth of what happened.
They were also a useful way to bring communities together, to share social
norms, to vent emotions, and to provide procedural justice. Trials could be
provided fairly cheaply and quickly, as well. Equally, however, other forms
of dispute resolution (negotiation, mediation, group conferencing, etc.) can
also serve many of these interests and others, and sometimes more
effectively. Both domestically and also internationally, we are seeing
disputants and communities use an array of restorative304 and
transformative305 approaches that emphasize remedies including apology,
restitution, reconciliation, and institutional reform, rather than focus
exclusively on applying law to a narrow problem. Non-trial approaches can
be better than trials at healing rifts, achieving broader solutions, and
resolving disputes efficiently and effectively. By way of inspiration, here are
just a few preliminary ideas as to how we could change our system of justice.
One relatively modest reform might be to provide judges/juries with
303

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is the Adversary System Really Dead? Dilemmas of Legal Ethics as
Legal Institutions and Roles Evolve, 57 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 85, 89 (2004). See also Michael Moffitt,
Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 728 (2005) (observing that civil pleadings, which
by their nature look backwards and focus primarily on monetary relief, are not well-structured to help
disputants find efficient resolutions to more forward-looking and non-monetary problems).
304
See supra note 218.
305
See supra note 228.
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more discretion to devise “appropriate” remedies—expanding beyond our
current focus on prison and monetary damages. That is, rather than have
trials primarily examine issues of liability or guilt, which will increasingly
be resolved by our new technology, we might also use trials to more
carefully consider the “then what” issues—how best to deal with any legal
infractions that have occurred. Judges and juries might be asked to look more
at underlying issues—why people did the things they did. Armed with such
information, judges and juries could be more creative at the remedial stage,
for example putting heightened emphasis on apologies, reparations, or
community service. Or then again, perhaps such background information
would lead judges and juries to want to be more punitive or to employ more
public notifications or shaming of perpetrators.306
Alternatively, perhaps we will want to put more emphasis on
encouraging disputants to work out their own problems—whether through
negotiation, mediation, or other versions of individualized dispute
resolution. If trials are less needed to get at truth in our new technological
world, perhaps individual disputants are best situated to get at their
underlying motivations and to determine how the problems between them
should be resolved? As mediation advocates have urged for many years,
individuals know themselves best, and processes like mediation can also be
used to allow disputants to come to know one another better.307
Unconstrained by the formal rules of court, disputants can explore
underlying motivations and rationales and become more informed about
how their fellow disputant sees the world. Through these conversations,
more creative, just solutions may emerge.308
Or, perhaps our new focus on non-truth aspects of justice might lead us
in the opposite direction—to seek more involvement of the larger
community in our justice decisions. Similar to how our medieval ancestors
chose to publicly discuss the problems of animals and insects eating crops
or harming humans,309 and to how the Goddess Athena asked the citizens to
weigh in on whether and how Orestes should be punished for killing his
306

Personally, I favor the former over the latter, but that is a subject for a different article.
See, e.g., Love, supra note 238, at 32 (“Unlike the blindfolded lady, the mediator sees all that is
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of achieving justice.”). See also ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
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“transformative” approach to mediation that can broaden disputants’ perspectives even if no settlement
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mother, we too may want to bring some disputes into the public eye both
to educate the public and to seek the community’s input. That is, rather than
relying so heavily on either judges or juries or on allowing individual
disputants to work out their own problems, we could look for ways to obtain
broader community participation in dispute resolution. The community
might not only play a role in interpreting the technology itself, as has been
discussed,311 but also be called upon to set out societal goals, to analyze
disputants’ likely motivations, and to help devise appropriate remedies.
If we were to seek greater community involvement, we would need to
wrestle with the important conceptual issues regarding what community we
are talking about. On the narrow side, perhaps neighbors in local
communities are better suited than random jurors or judges to help set out
goals, analyze disputants’ likely motivations, and figure out appropriate
punishments/remedies. Local communities might be defined geographically,
but also could be defined in racial, ethnic, religious, or other terms.312 On the
other hand, we could also consider a very different and broader
communitarian type of approach that might solicit a range of opinions from
across the country or even the world. If part of our goal is to bring us together
and come to more common understandings of justice issues, perhaps that is
the route we would want to take.
The internet offers us interesting logistical options if we want to solicit
such community participation. For example, rather than rely on
old-fashioned jury selection to try to secure a diverse body of twelve
decisionmakers, we might use the internet to present legal issues to a much
larger and potentially more diverse group of persons. Versions of this
crowdsourcing are already being explored. For example, online marketer
eBay has developed a system in which disputing buyers and sellers submit
their alternative versions of disputes to a panel of “jurors” selected at random
from among eBay community members who have applied to help resolve
such disputes.313 Other online entities are similarly soliciting feedback from
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how Ebay Community Court operates); see also Stipanowich, supra note 242, at 545 (same).
311

268

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

314

members of the public. And, as previously noted, some trial consultants
are already using the internet to get feedback on aspects of their case.315
The astute reader will have noticed that the various potential reforms
here are in tension with one another and that each potential reform has likely
downsides as well as benefits. Yet, while these ideas are in tension, they
certainly are not in conflict. We need not resolve all disputes using the same
process but rather could use trials for some, mediation for others, and
community conversations for yet others. As commentators including this
author have asserted, there are significant benefits to a “process pluralism”
approach.316 We might resolve some disputes in each of these ways and thus
will want to consider how best to assign disputes to particular processes.
While the issue of which disputes should be assigned to which forum has no
simple answer,317 it merits our increased attention.
CONCLUSION
We need to focus on how to reform our dispute resolution processes to
take account of our exciting new technology. While the technology will not
provide us with indisputable information regarding who did what to whom,
it will certainly provide us with a great deal more and often better such
information than we have had in the past. This Article has suggested that we
need to respond to these developments in three important ways: (1) consider
what forms of dispute resolution can help us resolve disputes pertaining to
the technology itself; (2) consider what forms of dispute resolution can help
us deal with human psychology that will inevitably impact our interpretation
of technical information; and (3) consider what forms of dispute resolution
can best help us move beyond mere truth to greater justice. It may not be
obvious what forms of dispute resolution are best to deal with these three
issues, but it is clear that we must not assume that the traditional approaches
314
See About PeopleClaim, PEOPLECLAIM, https://www.peopleclaim.com/about.aspx (last visited
Sept. 12, 2019) (offering pro se disputants opportunity to receive input on their disputes from third
parties, using the internet). See also Jurors, EJURY, http://www.ejury.com/jurors_learn_about.html (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019) (providing attorneys with an opportunity to get feedback on their case from a
panel of at least fifty persons who are each paid five to ten dollars).
315
See supra text accompanying note 300.
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See Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice, supra note 244, at 555 (“Such values [for process
pluralism] include the attempt to achieve peace with justice, choice and self-determination of the
individual with care and responsibility for others, and recognition of the harms of the past with hopes for
reconciliation in the future.”); Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing
Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1488–89 (2004)
(exploring which aspects of employment disputes should be resolved publicly or instead privately).
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Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2694–95 (1995) (stating that while it is
impossible to decide, ex ante, what disputes should be assigned to what kind of procedural process, it is
clear that certain issues are so important that they must be publicly decided); Sternlight, supra note 316,
at 1488–89 (offering thoughts on which aspects of employment disputes should be resolved publicly or
instead privately).
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will necessarily continue to be our best means of resolving disputes. Instead,
as we develop our new exciting technology, we must similarly be bold
enough to rethink our dispute resolution processes. The difficulty of the
endeavor should not deter us from taking on the challenge to rethink our
systems of justice.

